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BOOK REVIEW
FREE EXERCISE! FOLLOWING CONSCIENCE,
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE, AND OPENING
POLITICS
PatrickMcKinley Brennan*
That religion has caused many acts of violence and perpetuated many
hatreds is a datum of history. So has sex. Humankind cannot do without sex;
sex cannot be eliminated in order to eliminate its attendant evils. No more so
can religion. For the evils, at leastfor most of the evils that religion brings, a
sovereign remedy exists-free exercise!
Free exercise-let us Americans assert it-is an American invention.1
INTRODUCTION

"Free exercise"-not mere prudential toleration of religious liberty by government, but written into fundamental law a principled
guarantee that the exercise of religion will be free from government
prohibition-appeared first in America. That guarantee, though written into the First Amendment of the American Constitution, has been
only slowly but gradually realized. The idea of religious freedom
served by the guarantee of "free exercise" has spread from America to
other parts of the world. These, one might say, are John Noonan's
three theses in The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experienceof Religious Freedom.
* Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University. Work on this Book
Review was begun under the support of a research grant from the College of Law,
Arizona State University. Jack Coons discussed the substance of the Review with me as
I wrote, and then improved both the substance and the style of what I had produced.
David Kader thoroughly vetted that product, prompting sometimes substantial
changes (which I am afraid still do not meet all of his trenchant criticisms). Jeff
Murphy, Fernando Tes6n, and Michael White also provided helpfd criticism, both
specific and general. For the remaining errors, of course, I alone am responsible.
1 JoHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LusrRE OF OUR CouNTmt. TBE Amaic~A ExPERrENCE OF RELGIOUS FREEDOM

2 (1998).
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The book is grounded, as Noonan's work always is, in broad and
deep learning. Its historical analysis advances, as Noonan's work always does, by undoctrinaire argument and fresh grasp of perennial
issues. The book upsets expectations, as Noonan's work always does,
by how it embraces the new to perfect the old.2 What Noonan has
produced is a history-as rich as it is fresh-of the emergence of the
American idea of religious liberty, of the American experience under
the constitutional guarantee of "free exercise," and of the influence of
the American idea elsewhere.
In addition to the three theses argued, there is a premise operative in The Lustre of Our Country-a premise that allows the history to
shade into celebration. Noonan unmasks it at the outset of his study:
For God must enter any account of... religious freedom. On
that point you cannot be neutral.... For my part, I approach this
most difficult and fundamental of subjects not without diffidence
and doubt but with the belief that religion is a projection (for who
could deny the freight of human desires that every religion has
borne?), and that religion is also a response to another, an other
who is not a human being, an other who must have an intelligence
and a will and so be, analogously, a person. Heart speaks to heart,
says Newman with poignant lucidity. There is a heart not known,
responding to our own. Such is human experience. Religion is ineradicable because of this other and greater to whom we relate and
respond....
...
[R]eligion is a relationship to God; God is not a category;
and categorization misses the living communication between believer and God that is the heart of the matter. In the end, categories must yield to empathy and its necessary ingredient,
3
imagination.
Noonan does not treat "free exercise" simply as the citizen's accumulation of another negative liberty, a "principled" toleration.
Rather, Noonan celebrates it as the opportunity for the exercise of religion, which Noonan understands as the human person's free response to a personal god. 4 "[R]eligion itself requires religious
2 The phrase was originally used (aspirationally) by Pope Leo XIII in the late
nineteenth century, and later taken up as a personal motto by Bernard Lonergan:
augere et perficere vetera novis (to add to and perfect the old with the new).
3 NooNAN, supra note 1, at 1-2.
4 SeeJOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 19 (1996) ("[F]reedoms allow
us to engage in certain kinds of actions that are particularly valuable. The law leaves
us free to do x because it is a good thing to do x. This might seem pretty obvious. But
notice that it inverts the first principle of liberalism-the idea that the right is prior to

the good");

cf JESSE CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY. PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL

INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 11

(1995) ("Although it may be that a per-
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freedom. Heart speaks to heart, spirit answers Spirit, freely."'5 This is
the theological judgment that serves as the premise of Noonan's celebration of religious freedom. It has consequences.
For the believer, such as Noonan, free exercise is what creation is
for. But "free exercise," as Noonan is the first to acknowledge, is hard
to manage juridically, and sometimes believers and nonbelievers alike
conclude that the game isn't worth the candle. And so, Noonan reminds ominously, "[T] he words safeguarding religious freedom in the
Constitution must be applied in order to achieve that end, '6 for not to
pay the sometimes huge price "free exercise" demands is juridically to
block the human response to a sovereign summons to fellowship with
the divine. The theological premise brooks no compromise.
Noonan's three theses and premise are advanced through three
Parts, enclosed between a Prologue and an Epilogue (which I shall
describe below). Part One is entitled "History," and in its five chapters Noonan manages to trace the cramped, pre-American western
stance on religious liberty, to rehabilitate James Madison as the intellectual impetus behind the movement from mere religious toleration
to the idea of religious freedom, and then to create a vibrant impression of the American "experience" of religious freedom through presentation of several extended American vignettes. 7 Part Two, entitled
"Problems," is composed of three chapters. The first shows the "pilgrim process" by which, Noonan argues, the religion language of the
First Amendment is given effect by the judiciary. Part Two's remaining two chapters raise a question about America's "civic religion,"
which Noonan answers with a theory about the public place of moral
ceptive observer's conclusion that 'liberty is the end, the goal, and the entire rationale
of what the First Amendment says about religion' is an overstatement, there is general-it is fair to say nearly universal-agreement that the paramount concern of
both Religion clauses is to protect religious liberty: the freedom to pursue (or not to
choose) a religious faith.") (footnote omitted).
5 NOONAN, supra note 1, at 358.
6 Id. at 357; cf.Mary Ann Glendon & Paul F. Yanes, StructuralFree Exercise, 90
MICH. L. Rav. 477, 523 (1991) ("[W]hat has blocked the development of a consensus
on some such approach [to free exercise] is the same problem that is responsible for
the disarray of establishment law. the lack of a clear judicial sense of the purpose and
meaning of the Constitution's religion language.").
7 For example, religious experience and rhetoric in the mid-nineteenth century
are exposed through a chapter of excerpts from. the charismatic Boston preacher,
Theodore Parker, one of his critics, and his eulogist. See NooNAN, supra note 1, at
119-37. For another example, religious experience and the judicial handling of it in
the mid-twentieth century are revealed through a chapter describing and analyzing
the notorious Ballard litigation that twice passed through the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, on which Noonan now sits, on its way to the Supreme Court. See id. at
141-76.
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imperativesreligiously conceived. In Part Three, called "Influences," Noonan argues for the real but different impact of the Madisonian-American idea of religious freedom on the legal-doctrinal treatment
accorded religion in France, Japan, the former Soviet Union, and the
Catholic Church.
In this Book Review I undertake to identify and to probe the epistemological presuppositions of The Lustre of Our Country and to assess
the epistemic warrant of the claims made on behalf of "free exercise."
Such a project recommends itself for several, related reasons. In the
course of arguing his three theses, Noonan makes much of how the
idea of "free exercise" was conceived, developed, and defended. More
specifically, this book, like many of Noonan's earlier works, does a
sophisticated sort of history-tracking the development of an idea
through careful consideration of how and why a specific idea captures
the attention of specific humans in specific contexts. Noonan's work
is intellectual history that attempts to describe and explain the development of ideas, not by treating them as self-generated and spontaneously mutative but, rather, by understanding what humans were and
are doing with ideas, and why. In The Lustre of Our Country, Noonan
makes strong and clear claims about the intellectual process by which
James Madison arrived at the idea 8 "free exercise," and some of the
book suggests that the American and some European experience with
religious freedom since then has been an experiment testing Madison's
idea.
But an experiment presupposes a hypothesis, the gathering of
data, and a metron; and much of the time Noonan seems committed
to the proposition that Madison's idea, because of its epistemic status,
is beyond challenge or verification. Conscience, the pivot of
Madison's and Noonan's analysis, sometimes assumes superhuman
stature. At other times, however, Noonan treats "free exercise" as a
hypothesis, and provides a metron for testing it. But the proffered
metron, variously described as persons working out the consequences
of an idea or empathy or the imitation of Christ, is unsatisfying. Noonan has focused on the role persons have in working out the idea of
religious freedom but has stopped short, I shall argue, of identifying
precisely how that intellectual advance does and ought to occur. This
failure, I shall further argue, leads Noonan to provide not a reason,
but merely a brute experience, to justify "free exercise." The
unanalyzed-the brute-starting point of heart speaking to heart
8 I deliberately use the term "idea" to avoid introducing out of context the specific epistemological term "insight" that Noonan uses to identify Madison's cognitional achievement.
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leads to a doctrine of free exercise that one can only believe in or
reject.
In what follows, then, I begin, in Part I, by setting out Noonan's
epistemological perspective in a general way. In Part II, I summarize
Noonan's splendid account of Madison's contribution to the conception of the American idea of "free exercise," with a view toward pinpointing the nature and scope of the claims Madison makes, and
Noonan makes for Madison, for what religious liberty is and why it
should be guaranteed. With that in place, in Part Im I work through
Noonan's account of what he calls the "incorporation" of Madison's
idea by the Catholic Church at the Second Vatican Council. From
there I turn, in Part IV, to an analysis of the epistemological claims
Noonan has made with respect to Madison and the American Jesuit,
John Courtney Murray, who more than any other person brought the
American idea to Vatican II and its Catholic doctrine. Here I argue
that while Madison and Murray (and the post-Vatican II Catholic
Church, to the extent that it followed Murray) doubtless stand in favor
of a legal guarantee of religious liberty, they do so on very different
grounds. More specifically, I argue that Murray has given a reason for
religious liberty where Madison, as understood by Noonan, merely invokes the experience of an inner oracle called conscience. In the last
Part, I briefly situate Noonan's Madisonian position in the current debate, led by John Rawls, about the tenability of shaping public life in
conformity of what Noonan calls "moral imperative[s] religiously conceived." Here I argue that while Rawls's account must be rejected,
Murray comes vastly closer than Noonan's Madison to providing an
account of why and to what extent "moral imperative[s] religiously
conceived" may be given governmental effect without violating the
ban on establishment Madison thought necessary to "free exercise."
I.

EMPATHY AND PERSPECrIvE:

THE MINDs

THAT ANIMATE

HE RuLEs

Indispensable but insufficient to the legal process, living only in the
minds ofpersons and applied only in the interaction ofpersons, rules cannot be
the sole or principalobject of legal study, legal history, and legal philosophy.9
To name the person who has written this book about the idea
and experience of religious freedom is at once to make a point dear
to Noonan and to silence the other voices the author himself animates
in the new book bearing only the name John T. Noonan, Jr. Noonan
the person wrote the book and would hide behind no mask. Specifically disavowing the pretense to disinterestedness, Noonan begins
9 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw 17 (1976).
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with a Prologue that gives "my perspective." 10 Thereafter he employs
"a variety of forms to express the variety of perspectives that bear on
reading our national experience [of free exercise] and the paradoxes
it contains."'" Thus, for several examples of these multifarious forms
of presentation: a summary of the condition of religious liberty before
the American Revolution is rendered in the question-and-answer form
familiar to Baltimore Catechism Catholics; James Madison speaks first
through his own notes for debate on Patrick Henry's bill establishing
religion in Virginia; Alexis de Tocqueville's familiar account of religion in America is complemented by a cento of the language of Ang6lique, his more uncompromising older sister; the judiciary's
experience in trying to deliver the promise of "free exercise" is set out
in a first person narrative ("The Pilgrim's Process") that features such
interlocutors as Simple and Light, as well as law clerks Harvardman,
Boaltman, and Yalewoman.
"The chosen forms," Noonan notes, "are my inventions, the views
expressed real."1 2 But even the other voices are not, according to
Noonan, entirely other: "No doubt my own opinions breathe beneath
these masks.' 3 The book ends with an Epilogue, the last Noonan
invention: Ten Commandments (which provide an almost inspired resum6 of the book). The First Commandment makes the perspectival
point that Noonan adjudges foundational to his work on religious
liberty:
You shall conclude that the geneaology, the domestic environment,
the educational exposure, the intellectual adventures, the friendships, and the professional life of anyone treating this topic influence the treatment; and you shall suspect that the spiritual life of
the writer is relevant as well; and you shall know that no person,
man or woman, historian or law professor or constitutional com4
mentator or judge, is neutral in this matter.'
Noonan's Prologue provides the picture of his perspective he
thinks the reader requires; it cannot be summarized. Noonan's own
encapsulation catches the drift, however: "I grew up in a church that
formally denied free exercise and live now in the same church that
10 NOONAN, supra note 1, at 3.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 357. That interpreters of language must always-and not exclusively in
the context of religion-be attentive to when an author is biased, Noonan almost
certainly would agree. It is perhaps a function of how Noonan's account of how religious understanding differs from other understanding, an issue discussed infra, that
makes Noonan especially alert to the problem in this context.
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has come to champion it. This whole book is a reflection on the experience."'15 A Catholic growing up in the Boston where once Congregationalists-believers in the liberty of conscience-had beaten Baptists
and executed Quakers for their wrong beliefs, Noonan was interested
in religious liberty. Repelled by the Catholic doctrine that the state
should repress heretics, Noonan traveled to talk with Father John
Courtney Murray, S.J., whose scholarship urged a change in the Catholic doctrine on religious liberty. Noonan saw the appeal of a change
but knew that he and Murray lived in a Church which claimed that
her doctrine was always and everywhere the same-semper et ubique
eadem. "I put the question aside as not a practical one: after all, every
Catholic accepted American democracy and liberty of religion
6
today."'
But soon Noonan found himself inquiring into the possibility of
change in Church doctrine and discovered that changes had occurred. The fact proved the possibility. Noonan's attention had been
captured by "a much larger question, the relation of history to the
teaching of the Church, the question to which I have returned again
and again."1 7 Noonan ended up devoting much of his academic career to identifying what differentiates development from declension.
Each of Noonan's magisterial studies-as of usury, contraception,
bribery, abortion-pivots on what changed and what stayed the same,
and why. Noonan has not been afraid to identify change in Catholic
doctrine. "[W]hy should believers in Christ have such a fear [of doctrinal change]? The Spirit guides the Church."' 8 Doctrine's catholicity rests for Noonan on a foundation firmer than verbal continuity.
"'More facts,"' as Robert Rodes has written, "[were] to be a major
distinguishing quality" in Noonan's work. 19 But for Noonan those
facts do not lead to a universe of dizzying particulars. The facts are
ultimately in service of the question of whether doctrine conforms to
the person of Christ, which Noonan has identified as the only valid
20
principle of continuity.
15
16

Id. at 3.
Id. at 29.

17

Id.

18 John T. Noonan, Jr., Development in Moral Doctrine,54

THEoLoGIcAL

STUD. 662,

677 (1993).
19 Robert E. Rodes, Jr., An Overview of the Scholarship in Law and Religion ofJudge
John T. Noonan, Jr., 12 J.L. & RFLGION 533 (1995-96). More biographical data on
Noonan are provided in Kevin Starr, JudgeJohn T. Noonan,Jr., A BriefBiography, 11 J.L.
& RELIGION 151 (1994-95).
20

See Noonan, supra note 18, at 676.
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The giver of Commandment One has transformed "the temptation to commit religious autobiography" 21 into a duty upon this author, for the reader who would keep Noonan's First Commandment
must know something about me, too. Not one for supererogation, I
shall keep it brief. I was Judge Noonan's law clerk in 1993-94 when
The Lustre of Our Country was in the works. When Judge Noonan hired
me, he quipped that his one reservation about having me as a clerk
was that I was more of a Thomist than he. 22 I am not sure why that
was relevant. We talked about philosophy and religion occasionally
that year, but mostly Judge Noonan's law clerks provide him modest
assistance in the cases that come before him as a United States Circuit
Judge. Noonan notes in his Acknowledgments that "Patrick Brennan
did an initial investigation on the material on Russia" 23 for the work in
progress. True, but Patrick Brennan spent much more of the time
not researching cases sopping up the community Noonan created in
chambers among his staff. One of my co-clerks savored cuisine as
much as the other relished history; one of Noonan's two wonderful
secretaries is rumored to have once wished him an innocent "Happy
Good Friday." We all enjoyed and learned from each other.
I was the Catholic in the group Noonan had assembled-a Catholic born after Vatican II but the beneficiary of several years in Christian Brothers andJesuit boarding schools. Brother Columban, F.S.C.,
introduced me to John Henry Newman when I was twelve. Half-adozen years later in a Yale seminar on the idea of God in modern
philosophy, Louis Dupr6 gave me a skeptical introduction to Chapters
19 and 20 of Bernard Lonergan's Insight (reading later described to
me-by a leading American law professor who was a student of Lonergan and greatly admires Lonergan's work-as the stuff of purgatory).
I've been reading Lonergan ever since, including the years I spent
studying Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham in the Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies at Toronto. From mediaeval philosophy I made a
half turn toward law and have spent the last half-dozen years working
with John Coons on a study of the (American) idea of human equality
and its roots in an emergent theory of conscience; John Courtney
Murray, Bernard Lonergan, Alphonsus Liguori, and Semi-Pelagius are
among the heroes of the book. I teach and write about criminal law,
federal courts, administrative law, jurisprudence, and legal history.
21 John E. Coons, Confessions of a Semi-Pelagian,in WHY I Am

STILL A CATHOLIC

211

(Kevin & Marilyn Ryan eds., 1998).
22 See Patrick M. Brennan, The Standard (of Review) in Judge Noonan'sJudging, 12
J.L. & RELIGION 553, 563-64 (1995-96).
23 NOONAN, supra note 1, at Acknowledgements.
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"Let each one addressing this theme say where he or she comes from,
24
and goes."
II.

Tim

IDEA OF F=

EXERCISE AT TlE

FOUNDING:

IN THE MIND

OF MADISON

Whilst we assertfor ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal
freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has
convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offense against God, not
against man ....

25

Some legal scholars approach the problematic of American religious freedom by reading judicial opinions as conduits of the United
States Constitution's meaning.26 Others approach the same problematic by reading the Constitution as a document that in its entirety sets
out a plan for government and which in that context speaks to the
issue of religious freedom. 2 7 Noonan makes his approach by looking
first to a person. 'Words alone do not do the trick." 28 The person
from whom comes the American idea of religious freedom is, in Noonan's judgment, James Madison.
James Madison [is] the man primarily responsible for religious freedom becoming the first of our liberties. Of course, Madison did not
act alone. Of course, he had critics and opponents. Of course, he
had his own intention-documents are not drafted unintentionally.
Of course, he succeeded only because he incorporated ideas already
common currency, only because he accepted ambiguities understood differently by different factions, and only because he diluted
the clarity of his intention with compromising phrases. But to follow Madison is to catch the quintessence of the drive, at once
24
25

JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE

Id. at 3.

26

See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 5.

4.

27 Mary Ann Glendon contrasts such an approach with one in which constitutional law is reduced to an inquiry into someone's prized interpretations of the Constitution-something like looking at the Elgin Marbles with no regard for the
Parthenon. See Mary Ann Glendon, Comment to ANToNN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE LAw 111 (1997). See also Glendon & Yanes,
supra note 6 (urging the Court to adopt a holistic, common law-like approach to
interpretation of the Constitution's religion language). Noonan's analysis in The Lustre of Our Country is calculated to unsettle the lawyerly recourse to interest "balancing"
when one of those interests is the personal duty to honor the divine. See NOONAN,
supra note 1, at 374.
28

NOONAN, supra note 1, at 3.
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deeply religious and deeply political, for more than religious toler29
ance-for free exercise itself.
30
"Overshadowed by Jefferson, Madison was the better workman."
But Noonan's Madison thus is not only an able workman, the generator not merely of constitutional words, but of an "insight"3 1 into religious freedom-legal enactment of which Madison thought
"'promised a lustre to our country."32 Noonan's The Lustre of Our
Country identifies that "insight," traces its appropriation in America
and abroad, and approves it. "It is Madison whom American experi33
ence has vindicated."
We can pick up Noonan's fleshing out of Madison in the fall of
1773, when James Bradford wrote to Madison for advice about his calling. Bradford's options, as we would say today, were law, medicine,
and merchandising. Bradford opted for law, to Madison's disappointment. Madison acceded to the choice but wrote to Bradford:
I cannot however suppress [this] much of my advice on that head
that you would always keep the Ministry obliquely in View whatever
your profession be. This will lead you to cultivate an acquaintance
occasionally with the most sublime of all Sciences and will qualify
you for a change of public character if you should hereafter desire
it.

34

What he meant by "'keep[ing] the Ministry obliquely in view,"'
Madison clarified in his next sentence: "by becoming fervent Advocates in the cause of Christ. '35 Noonan summarizes Madison's exhortation to Bradford: "To follow Jesus in public life was to keep the
36
ministry obliquely in view."
Of many ministers, however, Madison wrote to Bradford in early
1774 to complain in the bitterest of terms:
I have indeed as good an Atmosphere at home as the Climate will
allow but have nothing to brag of as to the State and Liberty of my
Country. Poverty and Luxury prevail among all sort: Pride ignorance and knavery among the Priesthood and Vice and Wickedness
among the Laity. This is bad enough. But it is not the worst I have
to tell you. That diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution
rages among some and to their eternal Infamy the Clergy can fur29

Id. at 3-4.

30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 4.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 66.
Id.
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nish their Quota of Imps for such business. This vexes me the worst
of any thing whatever. There are at this [time] in the adjacent
County not less than 5 or 6 well meaning men in close Gaol for
publishing their religious Sentiments which in the main are very
orthodox. I have neither the patience to hear talk or think of any
thing relative to this matter for I have squabbled and scolded,
abused and ridiculed so long about it, to so little purpose that I am
without common patience. So I [must beg you] to pity me and pray
37
for Liberty of Conscience to all."

Noonan has this to say about Madison's words to Bradford:
Theology, or theological metaphor, to the fore. The agents of religious repressions are not comical elves but imps: in the lexicon of
the day puny or subaltern devils, as in the preacher's phrase "imps
of Satan." The principle on which they act comes from Hell-a
dark ascription; there is no evidence that it is less than seriously
asserted.... What is sacred, whose liberty must be safeguarded, is
the faculty by which right is discerned from wrong, and by which
God speaks to each-the conscience. What distresses Mr. Madison
most is the clergy's part in persecution .... Mr. Madison ends with
a prayer or request for a prayer. Against the background of his
piety, his words are not to be read flippantly or as an expression of
futility. Prayer in these circumstances was JM's earnest response to
perceived evil.3 8
Every person has a sacred right to follow his conscience, violation
of which right by government-even or especially on religious
grounds-is an evil. This is the "insight" with which Noonan credits
Madison. "Insight" is Noonan's term, not Madison's. Noonan does
not define it. Is it a bright idea? A hypothesis? A correct idea? An
intuition? Some other sort of experience? Noonan poses an ambiguous dichotomy and leaves his explicit treatment of the issue at that:
Mathematicians, it is believed, have their insights young, when their
purely intellectual powers are at their height. They need no experience to see into the world of numbers. Statesmen, at least Plato
thought, need experience. JM was either a mathematician or his
39
experience, supplied vicariously by history, had come early.
Conceptually, Noonan's epistemology includes the fact, and thus the
possibility, of something called "insight." Functionally, Noonan's epis37

Id. at 68. The language in square brackets is supplied from THE

AMEiucAN FEDERALISM: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON

FORGING OF

298 (S. Padover ed.,

1965).
38 NOONAN, supra note 1, at 68. The author often refers to James Madison as
"JM"; his convention will be retained herein.
39 Id.
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temology here seems to resolve into Platonic ideas or brute experience-neither of which would be capable of being tested. But what
Noonan's Madison had generated and possessed has been, in Noonan's own judgment, susceptible of experiential vindication. "At
twenty-two, using the Philosopher's stone of divinity, he had formed
and had articulated the insight that in revolutionary America would
40
carry the day for the free exercise of religion."
The day came quickly, first in Virginia. The year was 1776.
Madison was on the committee charged with drafting the Declaration
of Rights for the new commonwealth. George Mason produced a
draft, extending tolerance of religion beyond the bounds of English
law. But Madison "had thought about government and religious liberty," observes Noonan. Though conscious that "he was 'young and in
the midst of distinguished and experienced members,' "41 Madison redrafted the text. According to Noonan, "The 'fullest Toleration' disappeared and the 'full and free exercise of [religion]' replaced the
stricken term. Tolerance, out; free exercise, in-a decisive move.
Moreover, free exercise was what 'all men are equally entitled to.' Mr.
42
Mason's draft had said nothing about human equality."
The claim of equality had a purpose; it served as a springboard.
With what Noonan calls "peculiar daring,"4 3 Madison added a phrase
that eliminated Mason's continuation of the establishment of the
Church of England, thereby equalizing the operational bases of the
faiths. Mason and the committee approved. A delegate managed to
have the establishment language restored, but the statement on equality survived. "Slightly altered in the final round, the Madisonian text
prevailed. The cardinal change from Mr. Mason's draft was that for
'Toleration' Mr. Madison had substituted a phraseology recognizing
in effect that freedom of conscience was," as Madison put it a half
century later, "'a natural and absolute right."44 Noonan interprets
Madison's emphasis: "The 'absolute,' unitalicized crowns the emphasized 'natural.'"45

Still, more remained for Madison to do for free exercise in Virginia. In 1784 Patrick Henry proposed a bill "Establishing a Provision
for Teachers of the Christian Religion." The state was to support ministers' teaching of the gospel, though each taxpayer was to be able to
choose the Christian church to which his tax would run. Nonetheless,
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 75.
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"[t]he key term," in Noonan's judgment, "was 'establishing.' The establishment of religion was to return. '46 Madison went to work. The
product is his Memorial and RemonstranceAgainst Religious Assessments-

that panegyric to the good of the free exercise and the evils of establishment of religion. The establishment of religion is not to be permitted because-wrote Madison, twice quoting the Virginia
Declaration of rights-it
violates the equality which ought to be the basis of every law, and
which is more indispensible, in proportion as the validity or expediency of any law is more liable to be impeached. If "all men are by
nature equally free and independent," all men are to be considered
as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no
more, and therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their
natural rights. Above all are they to be considered as retaining an
"equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to the dictates

of conscience." 47

With fateful consequence, Madison had rooted the right to religious
liberty in conscience.

Henry's bill was soundly defeated, but that was not all. The ancient common law "penalties and incapacities" 48 for religious opinion
or religious teaching had survived the Virginia Declaration of Rights.
Now Madison pushed a bill (earlier introduced by Jefferson but defeated) that ended them. The bill's preamble (or "enacting clauses")
had it that "'Almighty God hath created the mind free"' 49 and from
that concluded that it was not to be influenced by the forces of human
50
association. There were to be no temporal burdens on conscience.
"Conscience, not church, became by law established," Noonan observes, and continues: "With unusual optimism Mr. Madison wrote Mr.
Jefferson that the enacting clauses 'have in this Country extinguished
5 1
for ever the ambitious hope of making laws for the human mind.' ,
Virginia was only the beginning. The federal union had been
formed by a Constitution that prohibited religious tests for public office but that gave no guarantee that government would not deny religious freedom; not only had Madison of course had a hand in drafting
and defending that Constitution, Madison himself had opposed the
inclusion of a bill of rights. Among Madison's reasons for urging
46 Id. at 72.
47 2 JAMES MADISON, THE W~rrlNGS
G.P. Putnam's Sons 1901).
48 NooNN, supra note 1, at 74.
49 Id.
50 See id. at 71, 74-75.
51

Id. at 75.
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against constitutionally staying the federal government's hand with respect to religion was a newly developed distrust of "'parchment barriers."' 5 2 To this was added a conviction, captured in The FederalistNo.
51, that the only sure source of protection for the exercise of religion
was the diversity of sects that in fact obtained in America: "'[T] he
security for civil rights must be the same as for religious rights. It
consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the
other, in the multiplicity of sects." 53 But without repudiating the
point about the empirical effect of the multiplicity of sects, Madisonunder Jefferson's influence-recovered some confidence in the
power of parchment. 54 There should be a federal bill of rights, and
Madison would push for it.
Elected to the House of Representatives following a campaign
that promised his support for a "specific provision" on "the Rights of
Conscience," Madison became, in Noonan's words, "the spokesman
for religious freedom in the Congress that was to begin the government of the United States. '5 5 Madison proposed two amendments to
the Constitution. The first was to be added to Article I, section 10,
among the existing restrictions on the states: "No State shall violate
the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial
by jury in criminal cases. '56 The second was to be inserted between
clauses 3 and 4 of Article I, section 9, among the limitations upon the
powers of Congress: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion
be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in
any manner, or under any pretext infringed." 57 "Conscience," as Noonan notes, was made "the centerpiece. The equality of the rights of
conscience was emphasized, as in Virginia. A national established religion was banned." 58 To follow upon the more primordial right to
conscience and religious freedom, moreover, Madison proposed an
59
amendment guaranteeing liberty of speech and press.
The Senate killed Madison's amendment disabling the states
from violating the rights of conscience. Nor did the Senate simply
accept the House's language on the federal power with respect to reli52

Id. at 76.
53 Id. at 77 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)).
54 See id. at 77. To be sure, Madison came to favor the creation of an entire
federal bill of rights for the political purpose of seeing the Constitution ratified.
55 Id. at 78.
56 Id. at 79.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 80.
59 See id.
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gion. From the House had emerged language that "Congress shall
make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise
thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience. '60 The Senate proposed another version: "Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship prohibiting the free exercise of
religion." 61 The discrepancies between the House and the Senate
provoked a conference, Madison among the six conferees. 6 2 From
the conference issued the final text that was ratified by the states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
63
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
Noonan surveys the result:
In two prepositional phrases (not clauses) the job was done. The
first phrase assumed that establishments of religion existed as they
did in fact exist in several of the states; the amendment restrained
the power of Congress to affect them. The second phrase was absolute in its denial of federal legislative power to inhibit religious exercise. Succinct, the amendment referred to religion twice but used
the term only once: no room to argue that the term changed its
meaning in the second reference. Pleonastically the practice that
64
could not be prohibited was denominated "free."
Noonan evaluates Madison's performance:
Imperfect, cautious, exact-peculiarly the triumph was Mr.
Madison's. At twenty-two he had seen what government and religion required-seen it in the transparent clarity with which a brilliant mathematician perceives a new relationship of numbers. For
over fifteen years he had worked to have his idea incorporated into
fundamental law65-worked not singlemindedly, not as though it
was the purpose of his life, but as for an ideal he knew to be sound,
of importance, and plausibly attainable ....Always he had counted
votes. He was ready to compromise to gain his end. He was not
wedded to words. He was conscious that words alone would not
work, although it was by words, after all, that the doctrines of religious establishment and religious persecution had been forged. By
words they might be exorcised. Patient, flexible, persevering, he
prevailed. He dared to believe that time would sanctify and public
sentiment would incorporate the ideal put in words.
60
61

Id.
Id.

62

See id. at 81.

63
64

Id.
Id.

65 Though sustainable, this analysis has to cope with the fact that Madison first
opposed a federal bill of rights.
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JM had triumphed.6 6
"Or had he?," asks Noonan. Madison had lost the restriction on state
establishments of religion; the religion language of the First Amendment would not be applied against the states until 1940.67 Madison
had lost any reference to equality, "to his mind a significant reinforcement of religious liberty. '68 Madison had lost, moreover, his clear ban
on federal establishments of religions; the enacted language arguably
only prevented Congress from interfering with the state establishments that spanned the eastern seaboard. 69 "What survived the Senate," Noonan notes, "was the ban on legislation prohibiting, that is,
denying or even restricting, free exercise. '70 The Congress that
passed the First Amendment then promptly established chaplaincies
71
and made public grants of property for the support of religion.
72
"The great ambiguity of the First Amendment opens wide."
Madison had had a different view about the proper relation between government and religion. "Free exercise" meant for Madison
no government interference with the obligation of conscience, and
that meant no government aid to any religion, lest government honor
one person's conscience more than another's. 73 The equality of
66

NOONAN, supra note 1, at 81.

67

SeeJOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,

THE BELIEVERS AND THE POWERS THAT ARE xiii

(1987)

("Prior to 1940 the Supreme Court of the United States had never upheld a claim of
free exercise of religion, had never found any governmental practice to be an establishment of religion, and had never applied the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the states."). In 1940, the Court decided Cantwell v. Connecticut,310 U.S. 696
(1940), "obliging the states to respect free exercise." NOONAN, supra note 1, at 34.
68 NOONAN, supra note 1, at 82.
69 See id.
70 Id.
71 See id.
72 Id. "And that the language of our Constitution is already undergoing interpretations unknown to its founders will, I believe, appear to all unbiased inquirers into
the history of its origin and adoption." Letter from Madison to Henry Lee (June 25,
1824), quoted in 3 THE REcoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 464 (M.

Farrand ed., 1966).
73 Noonan writes:
Free exercise in itself was incompatible with establishment. So [Madison]
had thought in 1776 in Williamsburg; so he had argued in 1785 in the Memorial and Remonstrance; so he had answered Patrick Henry in 1788; so he
observed nearly a half century later, responding to a minister who asked his
opinion "on the relation of [Christianity] to Civil Govt." "The rights of Conscience," he then wrote, were "not included in the surrender implied by the
social State" and were "more or less invaded by all religious Establishments."
It was his consistent, coherent, bold proposition. If Mr. Madison had been a
lawyer, it would be questioned as a lawyer's too close reading of language.
Cognizant of legal argumentation, JM maintained his view on a stronger ba-
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human consciences forbade all establishments. The exigence of that,
Madison's "insight," lay in the religious conviction of Madison the
man. "[R]adical separation is, JM declares, 'a just and a ...

truly

[Christian] principle.' It is Mr. Madison's principle as a [Christian]."74 Noonan's Madison is a devout adherent of Christianity.
Wishing "to be enrolled 'in the Annals of Heaven,"' 75 Madison had
kept "the Ministry obliquely in View"'7 6 and had sought to imitate
Christ in public life. Though quiet about his faith, Noonan's Madison
was forever in Christ's service. Madison, in his own words, had
"spared no exertion" to keep Baptist prisoners from imprisonment
and to secure their release. 77 Madison, in his own words, had acted
from "a mere duty prescribed by conscience." In Noonan's words,
The mere duty carriedJM all his way. The duty was mere; the prescribing authority was supreme. It was supreme because it was not
just an inner tickle, a subjective unease: it was for JM the actual
voice of another, a communication, a command. The ultimate
fact-the ultimate paradox if one likes-is that for the Father of
Free Exercise the rightness of the doctrine is rooted in his own
faith, a faith conventional in its day but for all that palpably alive, a
faith stupendous in modem eyes, the faith that God in us speaks to
US.
The radicalness of JM-should we say the madness of
Madison?-was to suppose that each individual has a zone in which
he or she responds to the voice of God, a zone beyond political
78
authority.
Noonan's Madison knew that there were risks entailed in his position
(people do strange things, not always obviously good for the collectivity as such, in the name of religion) 79 but was willing to run them,
"without discussing them," because he was
sis than legal dialectics. That basis was his religious conviction from the beginning that free exercise of religion excluded any governmental support of
religion.
...The sweep of what JM disapproves is striking. Separateness for him
means no public support for a church; no incorporation; no tax exemption.
NooNAN, supra note 1, at 82-83, 84.
74 Id. at 88.

75

Id at 86.

76

Id. at 87.

77 Id. at 88.
78 Id. at 88-89.
79 Noonan writes:
How could Mr. Madison, practical politician, constitutional architect, wise
statesman, have imagined that that [a zone beyond political authority]
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confident that the difficult cases would be rare and de minimisconfident, after all, that the voice of God would not often be heard
in distorted or eccentric ways. A modern reading of free exercise
notes that the First Amendment forms part of a constitution; it cannot be isolated from the structure to which it is attached; its interpretation, like the interpretation of every right, requires a
"balancing." JM could scarcely have disagreed with the structural
considerations; but he does set out "the great Barrier" as an absolute, an absolute that, like a mathematician, he was willing to see
asymptotically approached.
In the ultimate and absolute relation of each individual to God
lies the limitation on civil society and civil government on which JM
insists. Without that relation, why should a society be constrained
to respect conscience? . . .The theology underwrites the political
theory on the competencies of government . . . . By their con-

sciences the people relate to God. The faith that there is a governing God is fundamental. 80
Madison's faith is fundamental: "his theological premises compel
'81
these radical conclusions.
This then is Noonan's Madison: possessor and propagator of the
"insight" that men and women have a sacred duty and right to follow
the god that speaks within, a right that is compromised by establishment-including any government support-of religion. Madison's
"insight" sprang from his personal faith in a personal, the Christian,
God. But the Christian churches themselves lacked Madison's "insight"; indeed, the Catholic Church of Madison's day and Noonan's
youth favored its own establishment, repression of heresy by the state.
Nearly two centuries after Madison's Archimedean moment about
free exercise, the Catholic Church was asked, at the Second Vatican
Council (1962-65), to "incorporate the insight which James Madison
had so precociously articulated and asked his country to experiment
with[.]"82
would work? It was not merely that A's conscience might lead him to injure
B, it was that A's conscience might lead him to scandalize B (if Mr. Madison
knew any history at all, he knew that Quakers had on occasion in the past
walked naked into church); it was that A's conscience might lead to refusal
to cooperate in the common defense of the community (Mr. Madison was
well aware of his conscientious-objector constituents).
Id. at 89. Perhaps it is relevant, however, that Madison thought it "a safe calculation
that in this [case of religious freedom] as in other cases of excessive excitement, Reason will gradually regain its ascendancey." 9 MADisoN, supra note 47, at 487.
80 NOONAN, supra note 1, at 89.
81 Id. at 75.
82 Id. at 331.
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THE IDEA OF FREE EXERCISE AT VATICAN II: IN THE MIND (S) OF
THE MAJORrY

The Catholic Church, once a defender of the repression of heresy, became
in 1965 a champion of religious liberty on the grounds of both revelation and
naturallaw. A principaldraftsman of the new stand was an AmericanJesuit.
...[T]he American experience has been communicated. In each instance
the idea offree exercise has been dependent on the conditions in which it has
been received. Like religion itselffree exercise is culture-bound. Yet there is a
direction in which the nations have moved. The American experience has
lighted up the skies.8 3

Noonan tells the incorporation story with the enthusiastic nuance
of someone who was present. No one had ever seen a Church council
before. What people had were images-images of robed white males
hovered over by a dove representing the Holy Spirit.8 4 What Noonan
and others found "was a legislature in action.., with a right, a center
and a left."8 5 Its members, most of them bishops, met in the great
basilica of St. Peter's-itself an architectural tapestry like the documents that were to be thrashed out there to issue in the name of the
Council. These bishops drank espresso at the basilica's side altars
turned into coffee bars for the Council; there they engaged "in argument with other participants" that often continued into the streets
and neighboring buildings.8 6 For Noonan,
The experience of the Council was the experience of a demythologized church. Those experienced in biblical studies knew that in
the documents gathered in Scripture God spoke through human
tongues in human voices. Now the same phenomenon was observed in the flesh, as it were. The Council was the work of human
beings. Faith would accept its conclusions as the will of God. But
the conclusions did not come in a disembodied voice from heaven
87
or carved on stone tablets.
Again Noonan starts not with texts but with persons.
Noonan focuses on one person in particular, another JM: John
Courtney Murray. Murray exercised a great influence at the Council,
but the story doesn't begin with his touching down in the Eternal City.
Murray, the world's foremost authority on the traditional Catholic
teaching about the correct governmental stance vis-a-vis religious lib83

Id. at 8-9.

84

See id. at 338.

85 Id.
86

Id. at 338.

87

Id.
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erty, almost didn't get invited to be a Vatican II peritus (expert). Between the 1940s, when Noonan first traveled to meet him, and the
1960s, the value of Murray's stock in Catholic circles had fluctuated.
As it generally rose in the states, it came under attack at Rome. The
head of the Holy Office, Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, had a personal
interest in the subject of religious liberty, and indeed in 1948 had
published a book personally restating the traditional view at exactly
the same time Murray was attacking that position.8 8 Murray then
heard from Pope Pius XII'sJesuit secretary that Ottaviani's views were
not necessarily the Holy Father's, news which Murray publicly interpreted as the Pope's siding with Murray against Ottaviani. Ottaviani
took umbrage, and Murray's apology came too late (assuming it ever
could have worked). In 1954 aJesuit censor in Rome interdicted Murray's attempt to publish on church and state.8 9
The American assistant to the general of the Jesuits added, as he
communicated this verdict: "It seems to me a mistake to wish to
carry on with that controverted question under present circumstances." Murray replied, thanking him for his "delicate way of saying, 'You're through."' The American assistant promptly answered,
"You are far from through, I hope." Murray came back: "It was kind
of you to say, 'You are far from through, I hope.' I do not share that
hope." He had returned all the books on church and state to the
library. Ottaviani . ..had won hands down .... Twice again he

tried-in 1958 and 1959-and twice again his articles were rejected
by the Roman censors. He remained silent or, rather, silenced on
90
the subject for a total of nine years.
In 1958 Pius XII was succeeded byJohn XXIII, and in early 1959
the new pope announced that he was convening an ecumenical council, the second Vatican. The world's bishops were canvassed for subjects that the Council might consider. Archbishop Cushing of Boston
called for consideration of religious liberty, and the Father General of
the Jesuits did the same.9 1 In preparation for the Council the subject
was committed to the newly formed Secretariat for the Promotion of
Christian Unity. Noonan comments favorably upon what it produced
for the Council's consideration: "The... draft stressed tolerance as a
virtue and, beyond tolerance, Christian charity .... and it discarded

88
89

See id. at 332.
See id. at 331-32; see also DONALD E. PELOTrE &JOHN

LOGIAN IN

CoNFLICr

46-51 (1975).

90 NOONAN, supra note 1, at 332-33.
91 See id. at 334.
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the ideal of a Catholic state as the enforcer of orthodoxy. It was a
good beginning, made exclusively by moderate Europeans."92
Noonan's explanation of how the broad European mind of the
Secretariat should have advanced so far from the Ottaviani position,
"assisted only by a diffuse glow from America,"93 involves yet another
JM: Jacques Maritain-French Thomist, "the leading Catholic philosopher of his age," a man who "taught at Princeton but did not declare
himself a Madisonian. '94 Dislodged from more abstract philosophical
work by Europe's experience of totalitarianism-Fascism, Nazism,
Communism-in the 1930s and '40s, Maritain undertook to deepen
the Catholic understanding of the person and her relation to the
state. 9 5 Maritain's work is subtle, as Noonan notes; in it lay the ballast
of the Thomist tradition, reunderstood and reinvigorated. 96 New conclusions were educed from old principles. Relevantly, Maritain had
"translated into the language of person the traditional claims of conscience . ... 97 Maritain's judgment was that though the state had
responsibilities notjust to the material but also to the spiritual dimensions of the person, coercion to belief would run afoul of the reality of
personhood. Noonan captures the point brilliantly: "Who says 'person' says freedom."9 8 Maritain's deepening of the Catholic understanding of personhood was assisted by, and itself assisted, the work of
popes Pius XI and Pius XII, who in the 1930s and '40s increasingly
opposed totalitarianism on personalist grounds. 99 Maritain's was a
powerful voice. When Maritain claimed the significance of the American constitutional apparatus, he carried "conviction at the Vatican."' 00
He observed and approved the American constitutional arrangement
under which religion was not to be by government established and
free exercise was not to be by government prohibited. He even
quoted Murray. 1 1
Asks Noonan: "If the Church's leading philosopher, if recent European experience, if common political discourse all pointed in the
same direction, was it not obvious that the Second Vatican Council
92
93
94
95

Id.
Id.
Id. at 336.
See id.

96

See id. at 335-36.

97 Id. at 336.
98 Id
99

100
101

See id. at 334-36.

Id. at 336.
See id.
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should bring the Church itself up to date?"'10 2 It was becoming obvious, but still more had to happen. The Theological Commission,
watched over by Ottaviani, was also to study the church-and-state question and create a draft for the Council's consideration. Its product
not surprisingly "took the hard line of the past and put it forward as
theologically true."' 0 3 As time passed the question reduced to this:
which draft would the Council consider? Noonan tells a story ofjurisdictional wrangling that lasted, through different phases, from 1959
until 1965. But Noonan also identifies the psychological source of the
opposition even to the consideration of possible alteration in the
teaching on religious toleration. These conservative men, of whom
many like Ottaviani were curialists, "[w] ith all their hearts... did not
want change. With all their hearts they feared what change in one
doctrine implied for the stability and certainty of all doctrines." 0 4 To
avoid countenancing even the consideration of the possibility of
change in doctrine, the well-placed conservatives plied the levers of
power to keep the question from coming to the Council. And the
popes respected the bureaucracy the curialists had created for the
Council.

05

But eventually the momentum forward became too great. In
April of 1963 Pope John XXIII issued an encyclical, Pacem in tenris,
which not only raised, but ambiguously resolved, the question the conservatives were bent on avoiding. The encyclical insisted on the right
of the human person to act according to an "upright conscience," and
referred to "the dignity of the human person" more than thirty
times.' 0 6 The stage was set. "Almost simultaneously with the issue of
Pacem in terris came an official notice from Rome: Murray was designated an expert of the Council and invited to participate in its proceedings."'10 7 The wrangling continued, indeed intensified. But
Murray was there, and the American "insight" into religious freedom
had a voice. And in due course it had adherents, receiving conciliar
expression in the "Declaration on Religious Liberty," Dignitatis
humanae personae-the first words of the Declaration picking up the
linguistic pivot of Pacem in tenis-that was passed by the Council on
08
December 8, 1965, by a vote of 70 no; 2,308 yes.'
102
103
104
105
106

Id. at 337.
Id.
Id. at 337-38.
See id. at 339.
Id.

107

Id. at 340.

108 See id. at 348 ("Among those subscribing their names to the final text was Alfredo Ottaviani.").
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The Cardinal who would become Pope John Paul II had preferred that the document bear the title "Doctrine" rather than "Declaration." But as a slight concession to the conservatives, and perhaps as
appropriate for a document directed not only to Catholics but to the
whole world, Dignitatis humanae was a Declaration: 0 9
The Vatican Council declares that'the human person has a right to
religious freedom. Freedom of this kind means that all men should
be immune from coercion on the part of individuals, social groups
and every human power so that, within due limits, nobody is forced
to act against his convictions nor is anyone to be restrained from
acting in accordance with his convictions in religious matters in private or in public, alone or in associations with others. 10
What followed, as Noonan notes, was "crucial: the basis for recognizing this right.""'
The Council further declares that the right to religious freedom is
based on the very dignity of the human person as known through
the revealed word of God and by reason itself ....
The Declaration of this Vatican Council on man's right to religious
freedom is based on the dignity of the person, the demands of
which have become more fully known to human reason through
centuries of experience. Furthermore, this doctrine of freedom is
rooted in divine revelation, and for this reason Christians are bound
to respect it all the more conscientiously. Although revelation does
not affirm in so many words the right to immunity from external
coercion in religious matters, it nevertheless shows forth the dignity
of the human person in all its fullness ....
... One of the key truths in Catholic teaching, a truth that is
contained in the word of God and constantly preached by the Fathers, is that man's response to God by faith ought to be free, and
that therefore nobody is to be forced to embrace the faith against
his will.... God calls men to serve him in spirit and in truth. Consequently they are bound to him in conscience but not coerced.
God has regard for the dignity of the human person which he him-

109 See id. at 348-49.
110 Declarationon Religious Liberty: On the Right of the Person and Communities to Social
and Civil Liberty in Religious Matters, in VAricAN COUNCIL II: THE CONCILLAR AND PoST
CONCiLAR DoctmEmNrs 799, 800 (Austin Flannery, O.P. ed., 1980) [hereinafter Declaration on Religious Liberty]; see also NOONAN, supra note 1, at 349.
111 NOONAN, supra note 1, at 349.

NOTRE DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 74:3

self created; the human person is to be guided by his own [udg12
ment] and to enjoy freedom.
Noonan criticizes the document for "[t]hree large inadequacies. 11 3 First, he points out that as a review of history, Dignitatis
humanae personaefailed badly.
It referred to slips in conduct but not in teaching. It mentioned
only the freedom traditionally accorded the nonbaptized. It never
acknowledged the long record of coercing the baptized when they
were considered to be in heresy.... Even the lapses in coercing the
act of faith were noted in oddly impersonal terms as if "the vicissitudes of human history" were explanation and apology enough for
acts of persecution urged and undertaken by responsible Christians
14
in the name of the Church.
Second, the Declaration was vague in the way all juridical efforts to
identify the civic bounds of religious freedom have been. Free exercise could be limited to preserve a "just public order,"' but "[n]o
115
attempt was made to specify what constituted a just public order."
Third, on one interpretation of the Declaration, an establishment
("'a special civil status'") might be permitted the Catholic Church,
"' [g]iven the particular circumstances of a people ....
"16
Noonan
asks, "Was it really possible to have an established church and no religious discrimination?," and answers, "The Council went in two different directions."' 1 7 Noonan thus respects Madison's "insight," against
the Council, that if there is to be free exercise, government can favor
no church.
Noonan finds the deficiencies disappointing but the result a substantial accomplishment.
However characterized, this act of a world assembly of the bishops
of the Catholic Church had set a new course for that body as the
champion of religious freedom everywhere for everyone. The demand of human nature for such freedom had been affirmed ....
112 Declarationon Religious Liberty, supra note 110, at 800, 806, 807. In a document
whose publication accompanied that of Dignitatishumanae,the Council added that "it
often happens that conscience goes astray through ignorance which it is unable to
avoid, without thereby losing its dignity." PastoralConstitutionon the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et spes), in VATICAN COUNCIL II, supra note 110, at 903, 916-17
[hereinafter PastoralConstitution]; see alsoJoHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, By
NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A WESTERN INsGI-rr

(final
113
114
115
116
117

page proofs on file with the author).
NOONAN, supra note 1, at 351.
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Id.
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The quibbles and the qualifications of the text paled in the light of
the central contention that linked freedom to the search for truth.
"The truth shall make you free," John's Gospel taught. In freedom
118
only shall you reach the truth, the Council added.
When the Catholic Church abandoned the ideal of the Catholic state
as the enforcer of orthodoxy and the idea of prudential toleration
where necessary, it did not embrace "principled" toleration but, instead, a principle of true religious liberty.
Noonan is aware that for some-including Murray and Noonan
himself-the Church came embarrassingly late to a question that
nearly everyone had earlier answered in favor of some form of religious freedom:
If an unkind critic should remark that the Declaration was as inevitable-and of as little significance-as a declaration that modem
plumbing is preferable to a world without bathrooms, he or she
would have to be answered that what now seems inevitable came
close to not happening, and that far from merely registering the
obvious, the Declaration was dynamic in its implications for the future of a large spiritual society." 9
Finally, Noonan is clear that a unique concatenation of contingencies
alone made possible the Church's conversion. The Church had to
learn:
The learning had been largely from the United States: from its Constitution of such extraordinary importance praised by Maritain and
from the Virginia Declaration pointed to by Pavan [the Jesuit ghostwriter ofJohn XXIII's Pacem in terris]; from its bishops who kept the
issue alive as "the American issue" in the Council; from its theologianJohn Courtney Murray, who poured his energy and insight into
the shaping of the new teaching. Impossible without the recent European experience and the support of the bishops from around the
world and the receptivity of Italian popes, the Declaration on Religious Freedom would not have come into existence without the
American contribution and the experiment that began with
120
Madison.
IV.

THE IDEA

.,VANTIBus. FROM MADISON TO MURRAY

[I]nsights are a dime a dozen. Any insight, by itself, is quite inadequate.

Only the cumulativefruit of the self-correcting process of learning is signiflcant. The really brilliant idea, the stroke of genius, seems to be simply the
118
119

Id. at 352.
Id.

120 Id. at 353.
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occurrence of a final insight that closes a long, slowly acquired, interlocking
series of insights. Not only must insights be very numerous but also they alone
never constitute human knowledge. They presuppose experience. They must be
subjected to testing and judgment. Such testing varies with the matter in
1
hand.12
In the sections of The Lustre of Our Country that I have been discussing, Noonan means to show that from Madison through Dignitatis
humanae an idea-an "insight"-was going forward or being tested (or
both). If Noonan meant by that no more than that through Murray's
(and others') agency, the Catholic magisterium at Vatican II embraced some version of the American proposition about religious freedom (which Noonan traces to Madison), Noonan's position would be
largely uncontroversial; by now it is accepted that, for better or worse,
Vatican II baptized some version of the American idea about the civil
treatment of religion pushed by Murray the American.a22 But Noonan's project is not just a history but a defense and celebration of
religious liberty. It therefore involves epistemological issues of the
sort I first flagged in his attribution to Madison of an "insight."
In this section I ask as to the grounds and nature of the right to
religious freedom, what kind of knowledge did Madison have? did
Murray have? did the Council have? could anyone have? What does it
mean to say that an "insight" went forward from Madison to Murray?1 23 to say that Murray facilitated the development, rather than the
corruption, of Catholic moral doctrine? to say that Madison's "insight"
has been subject to an experiment? What, in a word, is the epistemic
warrant of the claim for religious liberty?
My answer is that Noonan seems to celebrate a right to religious
liberty rooted in a Madisonian epistemology that finds little quarter in
Murray's work. Indeed, the rationale for religious liberty embraced by
Madison and then by Noonan would be, to Murray's mind, unreasonable in exactly the sense that it rests-and rests purposely-on an epistemically indefensible ground, an incorrigible "insight." Murray
121

Bernard Lonergan, Theories of Inquiry, in A SECOND COLLECTION 33, 36-37 (W.

Ryan & B. Tyrrell eds., 1974).
122 See PELOTTE, supra note 89, at 115-36, 141; see also MICHAEL DAVIES, THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 120 (1992) ("Father Murray was determined to ensure that Church teaching was brought into line with the American
Constitution.").
123 Though it is beyond dispute that Murray exercised a strong influence on the
formation of Dignitatishumanae,in this part I confine my attention to Murray's Catholic rationale(s) for religious liberty and do not explore the extent to which it (or they)
prevailed in Dignitatis humanae.
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preferred to rest the incomparably important right to free exercise in
reason.
Reason has always enjoyed only an equivocal role in rooting
rights in America. The drafters of the Preamble of the Declaration of
Independence were aware that they were laying down broad principles for government. Jefferson flirted with exceeding reason and call24
ing them "sacred and undeniable" but settled on "self-evident,"'
itself an argument-stopper. "There is," after all, "no truth that can be
more useful to a politician than an allegedly self-evident or undeniable truth when he is trying to win an argument .... '125 The purposes
of the framers of the Constitution and of the drafters of its First
Amendment differed from the purpose of the Declaration's draftersto lay out not principles but a workable plan for a national government; the Constitution announces no self-evident principles. But on
Noonan's reading, for Madison the religion language of the First
Amendment confers a right in order to give expression to an
"insight."
As I observed above, Noonan never defines "insight." But what
an insight is matters to how we should treat it. If by an insight Noonan means what philosophers more often call an intuition, then what
Madison had was the incorrigible product of some sixth senseneither the result of, nor confirmable or impeachable by, ordinary
empirical experience; what Jefferson might have meant by "sacred
and undeniable." This possibility is suggested by Noonan's likening
Madison's "insight" to the Platonist's seeing an otherworldly form or a
mathematician's seeing an analytic truth. Indeed, for Noonan, the
Platonic-mathematical possibility is more than metaphor or simile.
'JM was either a mathematician or his experience, supplied vicariously
26
by history, had come early."'
Frequently in Noonan's analysis, Madison's contribution has the
cognitional status of a mathematician's achievement. Also frequently,
but without Noonan's making the disjunct into a conjunct, Noonan
has Madison remitting his mathematician's "insight" to experience. 12 7
Madison was, as Noonan explains, creating in the religion language of
124 MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIsT, AND THE CONSTITUTION 31-34,
212 (1987); see also COONS & BRENNAN, supra note 112, at 3-4, 19.
125 WHrrE, supra note 124, at 34.
126 NOONAN, supra note 1, at 68 (emphasis added).
127 Cf United States Dep't of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Federal Labor
Relations Authority, 887 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 1989) (Noonan, J.) ("It is a Pickwickian or Alice in Wonderland idea that what is a factual matter should be negotiatedsomewhat like the idea that you negotiate the sum of two and two.").
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the First Amendment an experiment to test an "insight."128 Noonan's
linguistic hook for this appraisal is Madison's assertion (in a letter to
Frederick Adams) that "on this question [whether the Christian religion, "'the best and purest religion,"' ought not to be financially provided for rather than left, as other religions, to voluntary support]
experience will be an admitted Umpire ...

129

Whether that passage can bear the weight Noonan assigns it is
hard to say, particularly in light of another of Noonan's claims about
Madison's epistemology. Noonan observes, quoting without reservation Morton White's study of the epistemology of the founders and
their documents, that '3M had a Lockean epistemology that led him
to believe that his belief was 'a self-evident proposition or one that
could be derived from a self-evident proposition."' 130 What this
means, Noonan does not elaborate, unless implicitly in his
mathematicization of Madison's cognitional process. White does explicitly elaborate, however:
[Madison's] belief in the undeniability of quasi-mathematical moral
principles which asserted that men have these rights was at least part
of his reason for defending them so adamantly against invasion,
even if an invasion of them were to promote the public good....
He rested his case [in the Memorial and Remonstrance] for religious
freedom on an undeniable principle of natural law the violation of
which could not be justified by any appeal to the whole society's
interests, however well supported by the relevant evidence. In other
words, he was not prepared to surrender the right to religious freedom by relying on an experimental statement about what would
make the people happy, partly because that statement could not be
as certain as the self-evident or demonstrable principle of natural
law which expressed man's right to religious freedom. Because no
experience could overturn a true principle ofjustice, whereas some
experience could overturn a statement that the public good would
be served by action, Madison seemed more inclined to favor the
1 31
principle of justice.
128

See Noonan, supra note 1, at 7, 90-91, 209-10, 331.
129 9 MADISON, supra note 47, at 485.
130 NooNAN, supra note 1, at 368 (quoting WHITE, supranote 124, at 28).
131 WHrE, supra note 124, at 221; see id. at 33 ("Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance therefore fortifies the view presented in the previous chapter that a statement
which attributes an unalienable natural right to every man was not construed by
Madison as a statement in experimental science as conceived by Hume. On the contrary, Madison regarded it as a statement in the abstract science of morality as viewed
by Locke, derivable from intuitively known and allegedly self-evident primary
truths.").-
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Madison may have been inconsistent, an inconsistency mirrored in
Noonan's account. But if on occasion Madison remitted his precocious "insight" to the umpire that is experience, Madison's background epistemological assumption seems to have been that the civil
treatment of religion he advocated was the exigence of a natural right,
a self-evident truth, a sacred and undeniable proposition. Madison's
seemingly was a claim of knowledge-unimpeachable knowledge deduced from ideas about God and man.
But however much Madison's Lockean allegiance drove-allowed-him to regard his conclusions as self-evident and unimpeachable, what Madison and then Noonan have to say about conscience
cannot be squeezed into or out of Locke's Way of Ideas. Madison's
and Noonan's commitment to "free exercise" proceeds, rather, from
their celebration of conscience in very un-Lockean terms-as an inner
voice or, rather, as the vox Dei within. Madison's claims for the
supremacy of conscience depend on its being not an internal barometer of merely human preferences but, instead, "the actual voice of another, a communication, a command." 13 2 But what is this thing
conscience to which we, like Madison and Noonan, make such easy reference without ever having seen one? Where in human experience
can this postulated faculty be verified? 3 3 Is conscience not a human
faculty at all but, instead, purely an extrinsic voice interiorly audible?
Madison's commitment to religious freedom for conscience is
"rooted," Noonan captures the paradox, "in his own faith... the faith
that God in us speaks to us"'13 4 as conscience.

There is here a tangle that needs untying, and Noonan would
agree. Conscience is a concept with a long history and equivocal
meanings. Noonan devotes the better part of a chapter to identifying
the notion(s) of conscience that "inhabited" 13 5 the mind of Madison
and the minds of those whom he addressed. Noonan begins the story
with the Hebrew concept, continues with the early Christian contribution and, following his account of Cicero's embellishment of the idea,
concludes: "Witness, judge, reason, voice of God, conscience enters
the moral consciousness of Christians." 13 6 The tangle is ancient. By
the time of Thomas Aquinas, some clarification was obtained.
Thomas taught that conscience was to be followed because it was, ex132

NooNAN, supra note 1, at 89.

133 See id. at 68 ("What is sacred, whose liberty must be safeguarded, is the faculty
by which right is discerned from wrong, and by which God speaks to each,-the
conscience.").
134 Id. at 89.
135 Id. at 58.
136 Id. at 44.
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acty, the judgment of reason about what was to be done, and all reason was derived from God. 13 7 God can speak, according to Thomas, as
he is believed to have spoken on Mt. Sinai and at John's baptism of
Jesus in the Jordan, for example. Conscience, however, is not the
voice of God but the functioning of (divinely created) human reason.
Thomas need not, and should not, be read as postulating a distinct
13 8
faculty that is conscience.
This truncated taxonomy of notions of conscience puts Madison's
notion in relief. Whereas for Aquinas conscience is the functioning of
human reason, for Madison conscience is the human's hearing the
voice of God within. For Madison the operation of conscience, then,
as Noonan emphasizes, involves an act of faith in God. That act of
faith, furthermore, professes not an external revelation subject to
group interpretation and judgment, but a commanding divine
whisper audible only within.
Madison's "insight" amounts not to a claim of knowledge, then,
but to an incorrigible act of faith that God speaks-and should be
allowed to speak-authoritatively within each person. The "insight" at
the root of Madison's fight for religious liberty is the belief that the
state must not interfere with a person's hearing and acting on the
137 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGIAE Ia-IIae, Q. 19, art. 5. Quoting
and commenting upon this text, Noonan writes:
In the Christian rationalism of Thomas Aquinas, conscience is "in a certain

way the dictate of reason, and what is proposed by reason is proposed as
true" and therefore "as derived from God, from Whom is every truth." In
this account, conscience can be mistaken; it is not an intuition of God or the
voice of God speaking within. But conscience must be obeyed because what

conscience proposes is what reason says is right, and "it is the same thing to
flout the dictate of reason and the commandment of God."
John T. Noonan, Jr., The Tensions and the Ideals, in RELIGIoUs HUMAN RIGHTS IN
GLOBAL PERSPECTrvE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 593, 594-95 (J.van der Vyver &John Witte,
Jr. eds., 1996) (footnotes omitted).
138

This bears emphasis inasmuch as it differentiates Aquinas's intellectualist posi-

tion from what is perhaps the most celebrated-and influential-philosophical account of conscience, the more nearly intuitional faculty portrayed by Bishop Butler
(1692-1752):

There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in everyone, which
distinguishes between the internal principles of our heart, as well as our external actions: which passes judgment upon ourselves and them; pronounces

determinatively some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to
be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust.
Bishop Butler, Fifteen Sermons, in 1 BRITISH MORAUISTS 1650-1800, at 351 (D. Raphael
ed., 1969). Madison was acquainted with the School of Moral Sense of which Butler
was a member, and Madison's teacher, John Witherspoon, had read Butler. See
WHITE,

supra note 124, at 107-08.
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interiorly audible voice of God.13 9 Noonan does not shrink from the
point: "The ultimate fact-the ultimate paradox if one likes-is that
for the Father of Free Exercise the rightness of the doctrine is rooted
in his own faith,... the faith that God in us speaks to us."1 40 Madison
has rooted the Constitution's guarantee of free exercise beyond rea41
son, in faith.1
For John Courtney Murray, the rationale for requiring a civil
guarantee of religious liberty is altogether different. 42 Or, more accurately, among the many defenses of religious liberty advanced and
probed by Murray over thirty years (including after Vatican II), none
approximates Madison's. Murray spent three decades trying out arguments for a principled guarantee of religious freedom, and (probably) never finally rested in any one of them. 4 3 Murray believed that
religious liberty was right, but he struggled to show why. Murray
thought that there should be a principled guarantee of "free exercise," but that was a bright idea he was at work defending until he died
of a heart attack in a NewYork City taxi cab. Though itself not unified
or always internally consistent, Murray's methodology is altogether different from Madison's. Murray had no mathematician's incorrigible
"insight." Murray, like Noonan's Madison, had an insight about religious liberty, but whereas Noonan's Madison 'justifies" religious liberty by merely pointing to the (invisible) object of his faith (the voice
of God), Murray was committed to giving reasons-notfaith-to justify
his insight about religious liberty. Indeed, Murray was committed to
religious liberty in order to open for people, including the Church,
the space in which to search for and find the truth.
During the 1940s and most of the '50s, Murray began from the
sense or observation that civilized peoples postulate a human right to
religious liberty, and then tried to educe support for that conclusion
from the inherited Catholic premises on the subject. The failure of
those arguments, to Murray's mind, has been masterfully recounted
elsewhere.' 44 Eventually Murray began to question the contemporary
139 See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 89.
140 Id.
141 Noonan recks the risk and implicitly acknowledges the error in Madison's "insight." See Noonan, supra note 137, at 600 ("To hold that religion is truly excepted
from all political authority is more mad than Madisonian.").

142 Murray forcefully opposes justifying the religion language of the First Amendment in the terms propounded by "theologians of the First Amendment." JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY, SJ., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AmERIcAN PROPOSrION

143

48-56 (1988).

See generallyJ. LEON HOOPER, SJ., THE ETmICS OF DISCOURSE: THE SOCAL
LOSOPHY OFJOHN COURTNEY MURRAY (1986).

144 See id. at 10-50.
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relevance of the inherited statements on the topic, and by some time
in the late 1950s Murray had come under the influence of the work of
his fellow Jesuit, Bernard Lonergan. Murray adopted many of Lonergan's terms and concepts, and generally aligned his methodological
commitments with what he took to be Lonergan's. 145 The pivot of
that method, which requires some elaboration if we are to understand
the epistemic warrant of Murray's argument for religious liberty, is the
14 6
fact of history and historical consciousness.
Murray's conservative opponents marshalled an arsenal of
sentences, mostly from nineteenth-century papal pronouncements,
which-they claimed-ruled out the possibility that the state should
protect religious liberty. 147 Murray agreed that the encyclicals opposed religious liberty of a certain kind, but he insisted that they must
be read in their historical situation, in the context of the specific evils
at which they were aimed. The problem, according to Murray, was
that the old concepts in force were rooted in political realities no
145 For the most sensitive treatment of Murray's reliance on Lonergan, see generally HOOPER, supra note 143. How much of Lonergan's work Murray was familiar
with, and how deeply he understood it, are apt questions, not here in need of answers.
146 See id. at 137-39, 155, 246, 248-49; BernardJ.F. Lonergan, S.J., The Transition
from a Classicist World-View to Historical Mindedness, in A SECOND COLLECrION, supra
note 121, at 1-11. For a critical analysis of Murray's reliance on Lonergan, see KEITH
J. PAVLISCHEK, JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY AND THE DILEMMA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION

173-79 (1994). Murray "play[ed] down" the political theories of the founders, such
as Madison, who sometimes brought to the constitutional issues of religious freedom
the "'a priori demands' of a doctrinaire blueprint." Id. at 121.
147 Noonan provides this summary of the nineteenth century papal treatment of
"religious liberty":
The unanimity of the [twentieth century conservative] theologians was no
accident. They were united because they followed what Gregory XVI had
taught in Mirari vos, what Pius IX had taught in Quanta cura, what Leo XIII
in the wake of his predecessors had proclaimed in Immortale Dei. In Mirari
vos Gregory XVI had responded to the efforts of Felicite de Lamennais to
make the church a champion of religious liberty. The pope assailed "indifferentism," described as the doctrine that anyone could obtain eternal salvation, whatever his beliefs, provided he lived a decent moral life. "From this
most foul font of indifferentism," Gregory XVI went on, "flows that absurd
and erroneous opinion, or, rather, madness, that freedom of conscience
must be affirmed and defended for everyone." In Quanta cura Pius IX repeated Gregory XVI's attack on "the madness that freedom of conscience
and of worship is the proper right of every human being and ought to be
proclaimed by law and maintained in every rightly-constituted society ....
Read outside the broader context of Christian teaching [on the rights of
conscience], the encyclicals stood like boulders barring recognition of the
universal freedom of conscience."
NOONAN, supra note 1, at 27.
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longer in force.' 48 Murray insisted that the words and concepts, even
of papal documents, must be given only the force required by the context of their utterance. 149 How religious liberty should be handled by
government is, for Murray, a question that is asked-and therefore
must be answered-in the present. The answer could be the same
only if the question were the same in all its implications.
To Murray's mind, moreover, the questions had changed. When
he heard people ask about religious freedom, they had new things in
mind. It is here that the bite of Murray's historical method is at its
deepest. The requirement of religious freedom is, to Murray's mind,
a new discovery.
The notion of religious freedom as a human and civil right, personal and corporate, is not to be sought in theologians of the nineteenth century, since it is explicitly the product of a twentiethcentury insight into the exigencies of the personal and political consciousness. The link between religious freedom and limited constitutional government, and the link between the freedom of the
Church and the freedom of the people-these were not nineteenthcentury theological-political insights. They became available only
within twentieth-century perspectives, created by the "signs of the
times." The two links were not forged by abstract deductive logic
but by history, by the historical advance of totalitarian government,
and by the corresponding new appreciation of constitutional government .... Today, religious freedom, as a human and civil right,
personal and corporate, which requires the protection of a legal institution, has emerged as an exigence of the personal and political
reason. As such, it claims the sanction of Catholic doctrine.' 50
Murray's position, then, is not only that past language must be read in
light of its historical context; Murray also holds that human consciousness is historical, growing in its grasp of political and theological
truth. We know today what we didn't-and couldn't have-known in
148 See id. at 334.
149 See John Courtney Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 25 THEOLOGICAL
Sru. 503 (1964). Murray wrote:
[11n judging all past or present realizations of the Catholic state, so called,
the historical situation needs to be considered. The historical institutions of
establishment and intolerance are to be judged in situ. They might well be
judged valid in situ. The function of law, said the Jurist, is to be useful to the
people. These institutions might well have been useful to the people, in the
condition of the personal and political consciousness at the time. This was
Leo XIII's judgment. It would be anachronistic to question it.
Id. at 569-70.

150 Id. at 568, 570. Murray himself, then, does not find his own insight in
Madison's "insight" of two centuries earlier.
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the past. Nor is the Church herself exempt from the exigence of
learning through time.' 51 The Church does-and indeed must15 2
learn historically.
It was this very rocky issue, of whether Catholic doctrine can develop, on which the fathers at Vatican II repeatedly ran aground. During the last of many hiatuses contrived by the conservatives to delay
the Council's vote on the text of Dignitatis humanae, Murray wrote:
"[R] eligious freedom is not the most important issue before the
Council, nor the most difficult, except insofar as it raises the issue of
development of doctrine, which is the issue underlying all issues at the
Council."' g5 The fathers of Vatican II did not founder on that issue.
"The meaning of Vatican II," it pleased Lonergan to observe, "was the
acknowledgement of history,"'154 and with that acknowledgment-and
in part because of it-came the acknowledgment of the right to religious liberty. The pivot was the acknowledgment that humans, even
constituted as the holy Catholic Church, come to the truth in time.
The forms of that acknowledgment were not uniform, and sometimes
were grudging and unclear.' 5 5 But Dignitatishumanae itself beganwith
the observation that "Contemporary man is becoming increasingly
conscious of the dignity of the human person" and "demanding" constitutional limitations on governmental power in order that man
might responsibly exercise his freedom, including his freedom to
search for God, and then explained its method:
This Vatican Council pays careful attention to these spiritual aspirations and, with a view toward declaring to what extent they are in
accord with truth and justice, searches the sacred tradition and
teaching of the Church, from Which it draws forth new things that
1 56
are always in harmony with the old.
Not as candid an admission as one might have hoped; certainly not
Murray's bald insistence that the requirement of religious liberty is a
twentieth-century discovery. But even the suggestion that "new
151 See NOONAN, supra note 1 at 349 ("In this area of political morality an evolving
human consciousness was made a collaborator of the Church.").
152 See Murray, supra note 149, at 573-74.
153 John Courtney Murray, This Matterof Religious Freedom,AMERICA, Jan. 9, 1965, at

43.
154 Bernard Lonergan in Conversation (March 28, 1980), in CuaIosrT
CENTER OF ONE'S LIFE: STATEMENTS AND QUESTIONS OF R. ERIC O'CONNOR 426

AT THE

(J. Mar-

tin O'Hara 1987) (quoting Lonergan).
155 See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 351; see, e.g., Dogmatic Constitution on DivineRevelation (Dei verbum), in VATICAN COUNCIL II, supra note 110, at 750, 754 ("There is a
growth in insight into the realities and words that are being passed on.").
156 Declaration on Religious Liberty, supra note 110, at 799.
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967

things" might be educed from the old reduced the conservatives to
1 57
their precatory knees.
The deep difficulty was the spectre of doctrine that develops. If
Catholic doctrine is not semper et ubique eadem, what is to guarantee
that in its next form it will still be Catholic? The Council's documents
never ask and answer the question squarely. Noonan educes the "theory of development" he takes the Council "implicitly" to have
adopted. 158 First, the Council conceded that the Church learns from
human experience. Second, the Council postulated the need for psychological freedom in reaching the truth, and its corollary, "free and
open debate." Third, the Council in all of its teaching pointed to the
pedagogy of Christ, thus "show[ing] that development of Christian
doctrine meant a deeper, more faithful response to Christ."' 59 Faithful Catholics, according to Noonan, will accept the teachings of the
Council as the will of God, in the belief that "[t]he Spirit guides the
60
Church."'
But one might ask, as Murray did, what the intelligible path was
from the nineteenth-century denunciations of religious liberty to its
embrace in Dignitatis humanae. A growth in historical consciousness,
yes; but not every one of those a new doctrine makes.161 In the explanatory document (relatio) with which he accompanied Dignitatis
humanae at Vatican II, Murray himself confessed to not knowing:
Some Fathers affirm that the Declaration does not sufficiently show
how our doctrine is not opposed to ecclesiastical documents up till
the time of the Supreme Pontiff Leo XIII. As we said in the last
relatio, this is a matter for future theological and historical studies to
162
bring to light more fully.
Murray made the same confession in his introduction to his English
translation of Dignitatis,this time fully in context:
The notion of development, not the notion of religious freedom,
was the real sticking-point for many of those who opposed the Declaration even to the end. The course of the development between
the Syllabus of Errors (1864) and DignitatisHumanaePersonae (1965)
157 Noonan calls attention to "the difficulty of abandoning past precedents without appearing arbitrary and the difficulty of departing from one's ancestors without
denouncing them." NOONAN, supra note 1, at 351.
158 Id. at 352.
159 Id. at 352-53.
160 Noonan, supra note 18, at 677.
161 See HooPER, supra note 143, at 155 ("After the Council.... [Murray] himself
understood the need to frame an argument... which would be more than a recognition of a contingent social fact.").
162 DAvims, supra note 122, at 200 (quoting Murray).
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still remains to be explained by theologians. But the Council
for1 6
3
mally sanctioned the validity of the development itself ....
This ignorance was for Murray no cause for skepticism, however:
The theological task is to trace the stages in the growth of the tradition as it makes its way through history.... The task is to discern
the elements of the tradition that are embedded in some historically
conditioned synthesis that, as a synthesis, has become archaistic.
The further task is to discern the "growing end" of the tradition; it is
under the
normally indicated by the new question that is taking shape
164
impact of the historical movement of events and ideas.
The "growing end"-something already real-is reassuringly invoked
as the locus of an active continuity.
Fixing on Murray's "growing end" language, Noonan opines that
"[i] nto a theological system that stressed continuity a dynamism was
introduced."1 6 5 Correct. But Noonan continues, "The key concept
reflected the language of Bernard Lonergan .... -166 Not quite, and
the difference is dispositive of what, for Murray, is the intelligible
ground of religious liberty. It is here that Murray parts company with
Noonan and Noonan's Madison.
Dynamism is indeed at the root of Lonergan's philosophy. For
Lonergan, however, that dynamism is not external (the "growing end"
of a tradition). Rather, it is internal-the active eros of the human
mind for correct understanding-Murray's "the new question." Each
rational person, Lonergan avers, is always already propelled by a dynamic desire for understanding to ask questions of her experience, to
formulate interpretations of her experience, and then to decide-to
judge-whether that interpretation is true. For Lonergan, the sole
criterion of true judgment, including judgment that makes doctrine,
is whether it meets the demands of dynamic human intelligence ask167
ing all of the relevant questions of data.
163 John Courtney Murray, Introduction to Religious Freedom, in THE
II 673 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J. ed., 1966).
164 Murray, supra note 149, at 569 (emphasis added).
165 NOONAN, supra note 1, at 344.

DOCUMENTS OF
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166 Id. Noonan describes Lonergan's book Insight as a "masterful treatment of
theological method in general." Noonan, supra note 1, at 344. In fact, Lonergan's
Method in Theology is his contribution to that subject, for which Insight, a study of
human understanding in general, was propaedeutic. See generally BERNARD LONERGAN,
INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1957) [hereinafter LONERGAN, INSIGHT]; BERNARD LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY

167

(1972).

Lonergan writes that the dynamic desire to know is
a self-assertive spontaneity that demands sufficient reason for all else but
offers no justification for that demanding. It arises, fact-like, to generate
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What Lonergan calls "insight" is the interpretation of the data.
The insight is not itself knowledge. Insights are a dime a dozen, as
Lonergan liked to quip. They are bright ideas that have to be tested.
Some turn out to be true, others probable, still others false. Insights
give way to judgment when the subject commits herself to the insight's
being true, probable, or false. Judgments occur, and then immediately are in the past, answers to old questions asked of old data. In the
present, the subject dynamically asks questions of fresh data, and must
answer accordingly. Those answers are what Lonergan would mean
by conscience. For there is, to Longergan's mind and to Murray's, no
high road, such as an intuitional faculty or audible divine voice, to
68
knowledge.'
This phenomenology of knowing and the resulting reconception
of conscience, which ground Murray's justification of religious liberty,
stand in sharp contrast to Madison's position and what Noonan takes
its epistemic warrant to be. As I mentioned in first adverting to Noonan's deployment of the term "insight," Noonan formally posits for
Madison mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive methods of knowledge: "insight," which turns out to be a subject's grasp of a Platonic
form or self-evident truth or sacred object of belief; or, experience.
Though Noonan then repeatedly indicates that the "insight" can be
vindicated by experience, never does Noonan identify the cognitive
moment or method by which, for Madison, the "insight" or the experience is evaluated orjudged-or how experience is judged to vindicate
the insight. Indeed, as for "insight" of the intuitional sort, the very

knowledge of fact, to push the cognitional process from the conditioned
structures of intelligence to unreserved affirmation of the unconditioned.
LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 166, at 332.
168 See id. at 600. Lonergan summarizes his own position in CognitionalStructure
in 4 COuLCTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN 205-21 (F. Crowe & R. Doran eds.,

1988). For a masterful, clarifying exposition of Lonergan's position, see JOSEPH
FLANAGAN, QuEsr FOR SELF-KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY IN LONERGAN's PHILOSOPHY

(1997);

for a succinct statement of Lonergan's basic stance, see Patrick McKinley Brennan,
Discoveringthe Archimedean Element in (JudicialJudgment), 17 L. & PHIL. 177-92 (1998)

(review essay).
It bears emphasis that I do not here offer a defense of Lonergan's epistemology.
Lonergan became explicitly relevant because of Murray's reliance on him, a reliance
noted and explained by Noonan. Lonergan then became important to the analysis
because on the methodological/epistemological issues that separate Murray from
Madison, Murray was largely following Lonergan. Because of his relevant differences
from Madison, moreover, Murray succeeds in ajustification of religious liberty that is
closer to satisfying both the terms of Noonan's own method and the terms of public
justification set byJohn Rawls (among others).
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point of it is that it is beyond question or evaluation; 169 it is to be a last

word-which is why remission of it to experience seems a non sequitur. And while being an argument-stopper may not be the point of
"experience" as invoked by Noonan's Madison, it comes close, or at
least appears to come close, to functioning that way. 'IM was either a
mathematician or his experience, supplied vicariously by history, had
come early." 170 Noonan never makes clear what, according to
Madison, the human mind does to know (or test) "experience." On
Madison's terms, as understood by Noonan, "free exercise" is never
justified by more than an untuitional "insight" or brute experience.
"Free exercise" issues from, and thus licenses, the oracular.
Sometimes Noonan's own epistemic stance seems Madisonian.
But Noonan's own epistemology in fact is richer than the intuitional
insight-experience dilemma imputed to Madison, because it attends to
71
and tries to make sense of the fact that the human mind tests ideas.'
But Noonan never does identify the cognitive occurrence by which experience and its interpretation are tested. Instead of a cognitive act
(such as judgment), Noonan leans on the heart, as had John Henry
Newman; Cor ad cor loquitur are the words of Newman's motto that
appear on the first page of The Lustre of Our Country. Reacting against
a doctrine of tradition that allowed for the possibility of development
only where the "new" conclusion was a logicalinference from what had
been inherited from the beginning, Newman identifed the "the whole
169

Cf LONERGAN,

INSIGHT,

supra note 166, at 366 ("Platonism is magnificent in its

devotion to the pure desire to know. But its failure to grasp the nature ofjudgment
resulted in a deviation from the concrete universe of fact to an ideal heaven.").
170

171

NOONAN, supra note 1, at 68.

Noonan writes:
IT] he process has been one in which an idea or set of ideas have had their

implications worked out, with the basic or dominant idea gradually driving
out ideas incompatible with that dominant idea's mastery; or to put it in less

patriarchal or Hegelian terms, human beings in conflict have come to see
that commitment to certain basic principles excludes accommodations and
deviations once accepted as normal.
Id. at 5; see alsoJoHNT. NOONAN, JR., POWER TO DISSOLVE: LAWYERS AND MARRIAGES IN
THE COURTS OF THE ROMAN CURIA xvii (1972) ("Magic, the whisking away of difficulties by a nod, the replacement of reality by illusion, is, however, but one step away
from creativity, the transformation of a situation by energetic innovation. Like magic,
creativity connotes spontaneity and freedom from iron law, but it also implies labor
and increase by organic development.").
Noonan distances himself from Madison's epistemology with the cryptic observation that "[t]he contradiction, or the paradox, of truth as one, plurally perceived, had

yet to be resolved or completely accepted." NOONAN, supranote 1, at 91. It has yet to
be accepted, moreover, by those, such as Lonergan, who deny that truth can be
reached ("perceived") without an act ofjudgment on the part of the subject.
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man," rather than logic, as the organ of change.172 For Newman, and
for Noonan,
The development then of an idea is not like an investigation worked
out on paper, in which each successive advance is a pure evolution
from a foregoing, but it is carried on and through and by means of
communities of men and their leaders and guides; and it employs
their minds as its instruments, and depends upon them while it uses
them.... It is the warfare of ideas under their various aspects striv173
ing for the mastery.
But if the ideas are using the mind, they do so in search of ever better
expression to what has already been felt; for Newman, the feelings
that issue from the intimus sensus are primordial. 1 74 And in this, Noonan seems to follow him: empathy, as observed at the outset, is what
Noonan requires.' 7 5 When God enters as a premise, argument about
God's place becomes practically irrelevant.
To be sure, Noonan postulates a process-and in his many studies of specific moral doctrines, traces the workings of the process-of
moral actors' distinguishing core values from transitory expressions.
To be sure, Noonan postulates the person of Christ as the metron of
such development. "The consistency to be sought is consistency with
Christ."' 7 6 But what is the metron Noonan applies to the evaluation
of experience, including the experience believers have of Christ?
When one goes to Christ with questions, how can one know that one
leaves with answers, not illusions? Is Christ accessible to individuals by
infallible intuition? I have no reason to think that this is Noonan's
judgment, though Noonan does have the believer "seeing" what the
177
nonbeliever cannot.
But if Noonan stops short of identifying the intellectual metron
that is the measure of epistemic claims, including those about God,
still he-unlike the Madison he shows us-puts the person and her
intellectual desire at the center of the analysis. Noonan predicts that
"[t]he human desire for mental repose is not to be satisfied in this
172 See OWEN CHADwicK,FROM BOSsuET TO

NEWMAN

123 (2d ed. 1987).

173 JOHN HENRY NEwMAN, An Essay on the Development of ChristianDoctrine, in CONSCIENCE, CONSENSUS, AND THE DEvELOPmNT OF DocuRR 31, 74 (1992); see also NooNAN, supra note 1, at 209; Noonan, supra note 18, at 672.

174 See CHADwicK,supra note 172, at 149-60, 180, 186, 191, 194-95.
175 See supra text accompanying note 3; NOONAN, supra note 1, at 334 ("[T]he
development of Christian doctrine requires spiritual discernment.").
176 Noonan, supra note 18, at 676.
177 See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 352. ("[A] believer would see [in Dignitatis
humanae] a development of the kind that is organic and that can as easily be reversed
as an oak can be restored to the acorn from which it came.").
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life ,"178 and certainly on that point everyone from Augustine through
Lonergan is in agreement1 79 (notwithstanding the static claims of a
petrified Scholasticism exemplified in such as Ottaviani). But from
that it does not follow that questions-specific desires that the mind
rest in judgment-cannot lead to repose. On the contrary, as I have
been suggesting, for Lonergan (and Murray with him), when a question is satisfactorily answered in a judgment, the mind has reached a
point of momentary rest-a cognitive and personal commitment to a
claim about the real. Promptly, curious minds will ask new questions
of fresh and of inherited data, and those questions will call for their
own answers. What is consistent is the subject's being under the demand of the dynamic desire to know, the subject's being at liberty to
reach ajudgment only by satisfying that desire. The subject-not Ottaviani's abstract principles-is at the center, but solipsism and relativism are avoided because the subject, by her desire to know, is always
already called out of herself to affirm the real and the good.
This, then, amounts to an extension of Noonan's focus upon the
person, a specification of the contribution the person makes to conceiving and testing doctrine. In the place of Newmanesque ideas
working themselves out through human minds stand the human
minds themselves in their intentionality. Specifically, the subject
emerges as someone who experiences, understands, and judges-fallibly and always without the help of intuitional certainty. Insightssuch as Madison's bright idea-occur, but they must be tested, as
Madison's in fact has been. Insights build on priorjudgments 8 0° The
testing and learning process works through not just one mind, but
through shared experience and understanding and judgment-the
discourse of the community through time.
To claim that knowledge is reached through a recurrent pattern
of operations throughout a community creates no problem for the
possibility of a Catholic magisterium so long as no enduring conflict
emerges between insights advanced "within" and "without" the
Church. It has generally been Noonan's judgment, according to Professor Kaveny, that there is "no ultimate conflict between the best in178

NOONAN, supra note 18, at 676.

179 See ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POITICS 122 (1987) ("Uncertainty is
the very essence of Christianity.").
180 Noonan's own method, though not the one he imputes to Madison, is in fact
quite close to Murray's and Lonergan's because Noonan acknowledges the operation
of experience, understanding, and judgment. He differs, however, by never explaining their operational integration and by assigning the function of judgment to the
heart and not the head.
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sights of humanity and those of the Church ..
."181 The issue, I
think, might be reformulated: regardless of who advances an insight,
who reaches judgment about it? For Noonan, the Catholic magisterium has "the mission," and in faith therefore the wherewithal, "of
determining what is only the projection of subjective feelings and
what is an authentic response to Christ as revealed."'1 82 But how is the
Church-the "demythologized church,"-to fulfill this mission? Insights are a dime-a-dozen, but they are necessary on the way to truth,
and there is no a priori reason that they must come from "within" the
Church; and recent experience has shown that some come from
"without." The question, for the believer, is who, on matters of the
faith and morals, makes the judgment about which insights are true?
Might the magisteriumjudge even a most celebrated secular insight to
be inconsistent with the understood data of faith?1 3 For the believer,
the question cannot be answered except in terms of where God has
promised his grace, 18 4 a promise likely obscured by the inside-outside
metaphor. Nor, for the believer, can the answer not reflect the fact
that in discovering the right to religious freedom as it did, the Church
181 M. Cathleen Kaveny, Listeningfor the Future in the Voices of the Past:John T. Noonan,Jr. on Love and Power in Human Histo2y, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 203, 224 (1994-95).
182 Noonan, supra note 18, at 673.
183 See PopeJohn Paul II, Ad tuendamfidem (apostolic letter motuproprio), (May 18,
1998) ("Ad tuendamfidem CatholicaeEcclesiae contra errores insurgentes ex parte aliquorum
christifidelium, praesertim illorum qui in sacrae theologiae disciplinas studiose incumbant,
pernecessarium visum est Nobis, quorum praecipium munus est fratressuos in fide confirmare
(cfrLc 22,23), ut in textum vigentium Codicisluris Canonici et Codicis CanonumEccesiarum
Orientaliumaddanturnormae, quibus expresse imponaturofficium servandi veritates definitive
ab EccdesiaeMagisterioprpositas,additamentione in sanctionibuscanonicisad eandem materiam spectantibus.").
184 Sin too, then, must enter the account. Noonan tells us unfortunately little
about his understanding of the operation of grace in human nature. Though acutely
conscious that humans have worked great harms (sometimes in the name of religion),
Noonan seems sure that somehow humans can create and manage religious freedom.
A more Augustinian analysis would be quicker to see a need for governmental restraint. 's own position is ambiguous: "The traditional ethic, which asserts the doctrine of the rule of reason in public affairs, does not expect that man's historical
success in installing reason in its rightful rule will be much more than marginal. But
the margin makes the difference." MuRRAY,supranote 142, at 289. See HOOPER, supra
note 143, at 210-13 (discussing the "deinstitutionaization" of grace in Murray's later
work). Michael White has counseled a more limited purpose for politics, in the dark
light of Augustine's understanding of the human condition. See MICHAEL WHrrE, PARTISAN OR NEuTRAL: Ti FuTnrry OF PUBLIC PoIcAL TmOR 168-72 (1997). But if
in Vatican II's understanding of politics the Augustinian strain of thought is little
discernible, this should not surprise: "Catholics have been rewriting Augustine for
centuries-by silent omission .... " GOONS & BRENNAN, supra note 112, at 317 n.93.
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made human experience and insights necessary collaborators in its
mission to know and teach the truth.
We have come a long way from Madison's postulation of "free
exercise" as an exigence of a sacred voice that speaks in the individual.
It is in that auditory moment, which Noonan describes as an "absolute
relation," that Noonan discerns the sole reason for freedom of religion. "Without that relation," asks Noonan, "why should a society be
constrained to respect conscience?" 185 Murray's answer would be that
reason itself-not the intrusion of an otherworldly voice-requires
it.186 The foundation of religious freedom, in Murray's mature view,
is the exigence of the subject and the community, including the ecclesial community, to work together to understand the real. 187 Murray
roots religious liberty in an un-Madisonian epistemology. Rather than
postulating the mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive disjunction
of an incorrigible insight or brute experience, or even "conscience,"
as foundation for religious liberty, Murray roots the right to religious
liberty in a dynamically unified, recurring pattern of experience, understanding, and judgment, with questions leading the subject from
experience to insight to a personal commitment-in judgment-that
her bright idea is true, probable, or false. Murray would root religious
liberty in reason, but in reason understood not as the passive receptor
of timeless truths but, instead, as the dynamic human desire to know
the truth working itself out through experience, understanding, and
judgment. Religious liberty is not only the consequence of how
humans come to the truth but also the necessary condition of their
coming to it.
Noonan is right: there has indeed been an American "experiment" with the metes and bounds and grounds of the right to religious liberty. But that experiment has been necessary exactly because
the question about religious liberty, its extent and justification, never
was settled by a mathematician's "insight. 18s 8 Instead, Madison's
bright idea about religious liberty has been clarified and tested
185 NOONAN, supra note 1, at 89.
186 Cf LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 166, at 632 ("Is everyone to use force
against everyone to convince everyone that force is beside the point?").
187 Which may include the divine.
188 SeeJohn Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green, The American ConstitutionalExperiment
in Religious Human Rights: The Perennial Search for Principles, in RELIGIOUS HuMAN
RIGrs IN GLOBAL PERSPECrIVE: LEGAL PERSPErIVES, supra note 137, at 497-557; see
also supra note 141. Murray himself denied that the American proposition as he understood it represented a timeless, ideal instance of government's relation to religion.
See PELOTrE, supra note 89, at 159. To have held otherwise would have violated his
commitment to "historical consciousness." Id.
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through a complex communal experience over centuries, as Noonan
himself concedes outside of the justification for religious liberty allowed by the reductive epistemology he imputes to Madison. The justification of religious liberty proffered by Noonan's Madison appears
occult in light of the alternative approach that takes its stand upon a
phenomenology of human knowing rather than a pure act of faith.
V.

AN IMPLICATION OF TBE IDEA: AVOIDING E STABLISHMENT
BY ESTABLISHMENT?

Before these bursts of religiousbelief, infiltratingthe society, capturing the
organs of government, the Durkheimian theory withers. These eruptions are
not the worship of society but its reformation. They do confirm Bellah's insight
that America wants to be underjudgment. They are a call to judgment in the
name of an authority above the state, and the state responds, subject to a sovereignty not its own.189

James Madison makes zero establishment of religion a necessary
condition of the realization of "free exercise" and true religious liberty. Noonan, for his part, approves this aspect of Madison's "insight"
and interdicts all establishment. In this final Part, I wish to explore
what it would mean for Noonan for there to be no establishment of
religion. Noonan's analysis upsets expectations, for though Noonan
opposes all government support of churches as an illicit establishment, Noonan judges government action based on "moral imperative [s] religiously conceived" not only consistent with, but necessary to
avoid the violation of, the ban on establishment of religion.
Noonan observes, uncontroversially, that "free exercise" has become an American ideal beyond challenge; also uncontroversially,
Noonan notes that in practice that ideal has been imperfectly
honored. 190 Establishments have been made. Noonan adduces the
standard and some slightly nonstandard examples-from government
provision of military chaplains to the courts' deciding which segment
of a church in schism is authentic and thus entitled to church property. 19 1 Noonan concludes: "Religion is entangled with government.
Will ultimately free exercise work itself free, so to speak, and end all
the entanglements, or will free exercise coexist, and even require coexistence, with them?"' 92 Noonan raises these questions but leaves
NOONAN, supra note 1, at 260.
190 See id.
191 See id. at 7, 196-97, 199-203, 228-30.
192 Id. at 7. Noonan suggests, again and again, that zero establishment may be
impossible to achieve. "The freedom of religion from the state depends upon the
judgment of the state." Id. at 6.

189
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them without final answers: "The experiment goes on. Final answers
are premature. Marred by occasional persecutions, halting in its progress, the experiment to date has not produced perfection; but it has
succeeded. 1 93 Noonan's Madisonian hope that government will
cease to promote religion will be welcomed by those who agree with
Justice Black's observation (for the Supreme Court) that the establishment provision "means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
194
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another ....
But as for the rest of Justice Black's-and thence the Court's intermittent-understanding of the purposes of the "Establishment
Clause," that "[i] n the words ofJefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a 'wall of separation
between church and state,"' there is no support to be found in Noonan's work. For Noonan, as for Noonan's Madison, religiously conceived morality is to be given governmental effect. Madison was
imitating Christ in public. 195 Madison's industry on behalf of religious liberty was, if Madison's own language in the Memorial is to believed, a thoroughly Christian project. His long efforts on behalf of
"free exercise" sprang from a respect for free exercise. In the Memorial,
which Noonan shows to be typical of Madison's treatment of the subject, the right to free exercise springs from the sacred and therefore
unalienable duty to worship God; the sacred and unalienable quality
of the human right springs from the quality of the duty. 19 6 Free exercise and the right to it are a theological exigence for Madison. The
constitutional restriction-or, ideally, the elimination-of establishment stems from "the Christian religion itself."1 9 7 Madison remonstrates against the Virginia bill establishing religion because it is
"adverse to the diffusion of the light of Christianity.' 198
Noonan is alert to a risk that in fashioning a civic sanctuary for
free exercise, Madison was violating the very ban on establishment he
himself thought necessary to religious liberty. 199
193 Id. at 7.
194 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
195 Cf Kaveny, supranote 181, at 215 ("Noonan conceives Christian ethics as fundamentally a matter of imitatio Christi.").

196

See 2

197

Id. at 187; see NOONAN, supra note 1, at 187.

198 2

MADISON,

MADISON,

supra note 47, at 184-85.

supra note 47, at 189.

199 In putting the point this way, I do not mean to obscure the fact that the religion language of the First Amendment is implicated only when there is "state action."
The question I pursue in this Part is the extent to which legislators' passing legislation

for what might be called "religious purposes" runs afoul of the ban on establishment.
I also have occasion to say something about the related but distinct point that "polit-
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Public argument is not the same as personal conviction. But public
argument that employs religious belief for its own ends, that makes
"an Engine" of religion, precisely parallels the exploitation of religion by government thatJM denounced in the memorial as wickedness. If he himself had made religion instrumental in this fashion it
20 0
would make him the hypocrite no one believes he is.
According to Noonan, "In the memorial JM addresses Christians as a
fellow Christian; he speaks as a believer in Christianity's special light
his argument looks to the evangelization of the world."20 1 Noonan
approves: "Free Exercise authorizes full mobilization on behalf of a
moral imperative religiously conceived. Free Exercise stands against any
20 2
takeover of the government by a church."
Indeed, according to Noonan, the personal freedom to seek society's and the state's reform, even for a "moral imperative religiously
conceived," is exactly what is necessary to avoid the worst possible establishment-government's establishing a religion that is the state's
worship of itself. Noonan makes the point with Emile Durkheim's
definition of religion as "'a unified system of beliefs and practices relating to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden,
beliefs and practices which unite into a single moral community,
called a Church, all those who adhere to them."' 20 3 Though Durkheim's definition imagines an ecclesial community, the functional
components of the definition make it applicable to any social body
united by beliefs and practices about what is set apart and
204
forbidden.
Such an establishment is not as farfetched as it might at first appear. Noonan devotes a chapter to detailed examples of the state's
sacralization of its own interests. 20 5 Taxes, the military, the exigence
that the judiciary act on a case involving questions of religion, the
United States flag-they are all areas in which Noonan finds government trying, often successfully, to put its own interests ahead of believers' claims on behalf of their free exercise of religion. From a rich
harvest of examples, Noonan draws the conclusion that "the interests
of the nation regularly trump religious claims in the nation's courts.
ical liberalism" (as understood by John Raws) may make it politically objectionable
for citizens to shape public life in conformity with religious reasons even where the
effect is not the establishment of a church as such.
200 NooNAN, supra note 1, at 87.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
203 Id. at 213.

204

See id. at 214.

205

See id. at 211-37.
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The untouchable domain is defined by the national interest."20 6 A
national religion, within Durkheim's definition as expanded by Noonan, is established; the nation worships itself, at the price of individu20 7
als' claims to free exercise.
"The dilemma is plain: we must abandon our national practices
or abandon our pretense that Free Exercise is our principle, unless
there is other evidence to be considered and a different analysis that
can displace Durkheim." 20 8 Different analysis, other evidence; Noonan has them both. "I prefer ... an approach not focused on the
institutional but on the individual."20 9 "Civil religion" is a construct
that explains some American practices. It "obscures the place of persons in creating the practices,"' 2 10 however. "Nations do not worship,
persons do." 21 1 Persons make up and perform parts in collectivities.

They are not reduced to collectivities; they have their own intentions.
Sometimes those intentions are religious, as were Franklin D.
Roosevelt's in his prayer with the nation on June 6, 1944:
Almighty God: Our sons, pride of our nation, this day have set upon
a mighty endeavor, a struggle to preserve our Republic, our reli212
gion, and our civilization and to set free a suffering humanity.
President Roosevelt was functioning within and for the collectivity, but
he fused his personal piety and his public activity. He shaped public
life and government action in accord with his moral vision religiously
conceived. Noonan's "in-between believers," such as Roosevelt,
abound, 213 and they do not offend by "establishing" religion.
Noonan proffers still stronger evidence supporting his different
analysis. The nation is not only saved from sacralization and self-worship by the personal intentions of its "in-between believers." Noonan
identifies two other kinds of barriers to national self-worship, the first
of which is a singleton: the "martydom" of the Jehovah's Witnesses.
206 Id. at 236.
207 To pick just one of Noonan's examples: Though Congress had exempted religious universities from income tax, when Bob Jones University sought an exemption,

the IRS refused to go along, and ultimately the Supreme Court held for the IRS. Bob
Jones's allegedly scripturally inspired policy was held to encourage racial discrimination. The Court called it a religion "so at odds with the community conscience" that

taxes had to be paid. The nation's interest in revenue, concludes Noonan, is sacred.
See id. at 219; see generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
208 NOON,u supra note 1, at 237.

209
210
211
212
213

Id. at 246.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 213
See id. at 244-49.
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Noonan tells that in the 1930s and '40s Jehovah's Witnesses were persecuted in Nazi Germany and in the United States for their refusal to
salute the flag. Unwilling to worship a graven image that would effectively make the state supreme, the already unpopular Witnesses were
subject to beatings, shootings, forced drinking of castor oil, and castration. 214 They were also subject to the Supreme Court's 1940 judgment, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, that "national unity," "an
interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of values," required that the
flag be saluted when the law demanded it.215 "Planned by no central
authority, unintended by the Supreme Court, overshadowed by World
War H, the legal and illegal persecution of Witnesses from 1941 to
1943 was the greatest outbreak of religious intolerance in twentiethcentury America. Popular religion, the national religion one would
be tempted to say, appeared triumphant." 2 16 It took the Supreme
Court only three years to reverse the triumphalist course set in Gobitis.
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,2 17 Justice Jackson
for the Court subordinated the national interest in unity to another
interest-the Witnesses' in acting in conformity with conscience. 218
Martyrs intend to defy the state, crusaders to change it. Noonan's
crusaders wage
campaigns to change the laws of the country and thereby to change
the conduct of the people of the country; campaigns waged with
intense and explicit religious conviction, with the use of religious
categories and symbols, citing sacred scripture; campaigns led by
churchmen and organized by churches, employing prayer in their
support and contending that the crusaders seek to enact the will of
God.

2 19

Noonan identifies four completed crusades, three of which he thinks
have left "indelible"220 marks on the United States: the abolition of
slavery, the outlawing of polygamy, the prohibition of intoxicating liquor, and-of course-the eradication of unequal protection of the
law in a movement led by the Reverend Martin Luther King in the
most Christian terms. Noonan sums up:
That cool eighteenth-century rationalist, David Hume, had
warned that religious zeal must be checked by governmental measures if disaster was to be avoided. Madison had read Hume and not
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

See id. at 242.
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940).
NOONAN, supra note 1, at 243.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
See id. at 642; see also NooNAN, supra note 1, at 243-44.
NooNAN, supra note 1, at 250.
Id.
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followed him: the cure was worse than the disease. Madison himself
had never seen a crusade. The eruption of religion into politics
that he had observed had carried him to Congress, but when he
proposed the First Amendment the experience of crusades was not
in the forefront of his thought. When the First Amendment was
adopted, it was without cost to government. Crusades have demon2 21
strated that Free Exercise is, in fact, expensive.
The nation has been reformed by crusaders who had moral purposes
religiously conceived, sometimes prayed with the people they enlisted
in their crusades, and even preached the gospel in summoning the
crusade.
For Noonan, then, "free exercise" means no establishment; but it
also means (the possibility of) "full mobilization on behalf of a moral
imperative religiously conceived." Anything less would be partial exercise, and the absolutization of the state. "Conscience, not church," as
we earlier saw Noonan say approvingly, "became by law established." 22 2 Short of establishing a church, action on behalf of a moral
imperative religiously conceived is not only permitted by the religion
language of the First Amendment as understood by Noonan; it is necessary to preempt the state's becoming its own ultimate-lost in wonder, love, and praise of itself as it interdicts citizens' own conscientious
conduct.223

That alternative is no imaginaryparade of horribles. The doctrine
of the "politically reasonable" as recently propounded by John Rawls
would proudly accomplish just this-a fundamental that is not faith,
nor even reason. That, of course, is not what Rawls says. What Rawls
says, at least these days, is that politics should concern itself only with
what people already (at least implicitly) agree about. The scope of
that agreement, eo ipso the scope of politics, is designated the "overlapping consensus" or "public reason." What citizens descriptively agree
about becomes how they ought to live. "The idea of public reason as I
understand it," writes Rawls, "belongs to a conception of a well ordered constitutional democratic society. The form and content of this

221 Id. at 258.
222 Id at 75; see supra text accompanying note 51.
223 See NOONAN, supranote 1, at 75 ("For every upholder of the supremacy of the
state JM's defense of free exercise is a scandal, a stumbling-block. The 'great Barrier'
stands against the sovereignty of the state. Each individual's religion 'wholly exempt'
from social control? No qualifications whatever on the right and duty to pay homage
to God as one sees fit? Surely, in the heat of battle, JM exaggerates! No, his theological premises compel these radical conclusions.").
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reason... is [sic] part of the idea of democracy itself."2 24 Democracy,
then, is the starting point-the fundament, the fundamental; and
what it establishes is this:
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and
equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are
prepared to offer one another fair terms of cooperation according
to what they consider the most reasonable conception of political
justice; and when they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost
of their own interests in particular situations, provided that other
2 25
citizens also accept those terms.
Citizens are unreasonable when they would speak and act outside
their homes with reasons other than those views of political justice
people already (at least implicitly) share. Rawls himself is eager to
draw the conclusion for moral imperatives religiously conceived:
Of course, fundamentalist religious doctrines and autocratic and
dictatorial rulers will reject the ideas of public reason and deliberative democracy. They will say that democracy leads to a culture contrary to their religion, or denies the values that only autocratic or
dictatorial rule can secure. They assert that the religiously true, or
the philosophically true, overrides the politically reasonable. We
simply say that such a doctrine is politically unreasonable. Within
226
political liberalism nothing more need be said.
In the name of "liberal democracy" our collective sights are limited by
and to public reason. The political values Rawls thinks people happen
to hold become supreme. The normative power of the actual has
been unleashed, generating a congeries of doctrinal manoeuvres that
mask an argument whose circularity is-as Professor Campos has observed-"breathtaking." 22 7 The circularity is the result of the state's
228
worshipping itself, a "secular fundamentalism":

224 John Raws, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CH. L. REv. 765, 766
(1997).
225 Id. at 770.
226 Id. at 805-06; see alsoJoHN RAwiS, PouncAL LIBERALISM 375 (paper ed. 1996)
("The central idea is that political liberalism moves within the category of the political
and leaves philosophy as it is. It leaves untouched all kinds of doctrines-religious,
metaphysical, and moral-with their long traditions of development and interpretation. Political philosophy proceeds apart from all such doctrines, and presents itself
in its own terms as freestanding.").
227 Paul Campos, SecularFundamentalism,94 COLUM. L. REv. 1814, 1821 (1994); see
also Patrick McKinley Brennan, PoliticalLiberalism'sTertium Quiddity:NeutralPublic Reason, 43 AM. J. JuRIs. (forthcoming 1999) (review essay) (aruging that Rawsian liber-

alism is intensely partisan and an affront to the demands of human intelligence).
228 Campos, supra note 227, at 1824; see generally Paul J. Weithman, Taking Rites
Seriously, 75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 272 (1994) (critically analyzing Rawls' allowing citizens to
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This variety of liberalism is properly understood as fundamentalist
in the sense that it denies the possible legitimacy of deep political
conflict in what it considers a just social order. The overlapping
consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is held to produce the authoritative (and authoritarian) voice of a public reason
that speaks ex cathedra, thereby eliminating the possibility of true
conceptual incommensurability and its discursive offspring, intermi229
nable moral disagreement.
Rawlsian "public reason" is a creeping infallibilism that would make
even the most virulent ultramontanist blush by association.
But whether this doctrine should make progress in men's minds
depends, among other things, upon whether it is epistemologically
tenable. The Rawlsian proposes to install the politically reasonable instead of the "religiously true, or the philosophically true," and in doing so he trades on the very epistemological confusion or conflation
that has occupied much attention in this Book Review: the true that is
exempt from the bar of reason. Raising our fears as he conjures "the
religiously true, or the philosophically true"-the interiorly audible
voice of God, intuition, brute experience, intimus sensus-Rawls ushers in, instead of the true, the reasonable. But on Murray's analysis,
following Lonergan, the dilemma is false. The true is exactly the reasonable, where "reasonable" means what meets the exigences of the
dynamic human desire to know through judgment. When the true
becomes coextensive with the reasonable, the adverbs-religiously,
philosophically, politically-drop out. The true is what is reasonably
23 0
affirmed. Period. There are no "grades" of truth.
appeal to their comprehensive doctrines only "for the sake of the ideal of public
reason").
229 Campos, supra note 227, at 1824-25.
230 Rawls recently has adduced Murray as an ally. See RAWLS, supra note 226, at Ivii
n.33; Rawls, supranote 224, at 796 n.75, 799 n.83; see also Leslie Griffin, Good Catholics
Should Be Rawlsian Liberals, 5 S. CAL. INTEmRDisc. L.J. 297, 347 (1997) ("No wonder
Rawls suggests that PoliticalLiberalism and this work [Murray's We Hold These Truths]
are 'closely related.'"). But on the relevant issue it has to be said that Murray would
be in deep disagreement with Rawls. Specifically, Murray understood that the purpose of religious liberty was the individual's "prolong[ing], as it were, this action of
the Church [on the individual's conscience] into the temporal order, in all the matters in which Christian doctrine and law has implications for the life and law and
government of society." John Courtney Murray, Contemporary Orientations of Catholic
Thought on Church and State in the Light of History, 10 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 177, 223
(1949). This is perhaps the place to obseve the error in Rawls' assertion that
"Madison's objections to Henry's bill turned largely on whether religious establishment was necessary to support orderly civil society...." RAwLs, supranote 226, at liv
n.28.
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This argument against "public reason" from the ground of the
unity of human knowledge requires no resort to Lonergan. Larry Alexander, for example, reminds fellow liberals that "There are not two
" 2 31 Political libways of 'knowing,' religious and secular/liberal ....erals and religious people alike must proceed by the same fallible epistemological methods, for no more primordial, privileged epistemic
path is available. 232 All truth claims compete before the bar of reason.
Jeremy Waldron is in accord when he urges the opening of the process of political dialogue and decision to all those voices that have an
intelligible contribution to make:
Even if people are exposed in argument to ideas over which they
are bound to disagree-and how could any doctrine of public deliberation preclude that?-it does not follow that such exposure is
pointless or oppressive. For one thing, it is important for people to
be acquainted with the views that others hold. Even more important, however, is the possibility that my own view may be improved,
in its subtlety and depth, by exposure to a religion or a metaphysics
that I am initially inclined to reject.... The prospect of losing that
sort of effect in public discourse is, frankly, frightening-terrifying,
even, if we are to imagine it being replaced by a form of "deliberation" that, in the name of "fairness" or "reasonableness" (or worse
still, "balance") consists of bland appeals to harmless nostrums that
are accepted without question on all sides. That is to imagine openended public debate
reduced to the formal trivia of American televi2 33
sion networks.
Opening politics to all contributions to reasoned dialogue may or may
not open politics to Noonan's moral imperatives religiously conceived.23 4 Noonan's clarification of that phrase's meaning is mostly by
way of his examples of "in-between-believers," martyrs, crusaders, and,
of course, James Madison himself. Madison, as Noonan has helped us
231 Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistenmoogy, 30 SAN DIEGo
L. REv. 763, 790 (1993).
232 See id. at 768-70, 790.
233 Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions inPublic Deliberation, 30 SAN DIEco L.
REv. 817, 841-42 (1993); see also Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public
Square, 105 HAtv. L. Ruv. 2061, 2077 (1992) ("Why doesn't liberal democracy give
everyone an equal right, without engaging in any version of epistemic abstinence, to
make his or her arguments, subject, obviously, to the prerogative of listeners to reject
the arguments should they be unpersuasive... ?"); Daniel 0. Conkle, SecularFundamentalism, Religious Fundamentalism, and the Searchfor Truth in ContemporaryAmerica, 12
J.L. & RELGION 337 (1995-96) (arguing for dialogic politics open to every source of

insight).
234 The tenability of a point somewhere between Madison and Bawls was brought
home to me by KENT

30-84 (1988).
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see, acted on a moral imperative religiously conceived. But in doing
so, Noonan's Madison made a moral change on a ground not accessible to anyone else: the God within that speaks within. "The ultimate
fact-the ultimate paradox if one likes-is that for the Father of Free
Exercise-the rightness of the doctrine is rooted in his own faith, a
faith conventional in its day but for all that palpably alive, a faith stupendous in modem eyes, the faith that God in us speaks to us."' 23 5 In

evaluating Madison's performance, Noonan asks that one concede what
Madison's theology assumes.236 When for Madison and Noonan,
therefore, conscience became by law established, faith was empowered to control public life.
Murray's stance is different. Conscience, but not faith, reason,
but not an oracle, is by law established. Murray, like Alexander and
Waldron for their different but related reasons, would approve of giving governmental effect to moral imperatives religiously conceived
but only where those imperatives can be understood and justified.
For Murray, like Alexander and Waldron, that excludes the possibility
of pointing to the deliverances of an internal oracle (even called "conscience") and then going it alone; it requires engaging in reasoned
dialogue. 237 Noonan's epistemological equivocations leave open the
235 NOONAN, supra note 1, at 89.
236 See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 83 ("Cognizant of legal argumentation, JM maintained his view on a stronger basis than legal dialectics. That basis was his religious
conviction from the beginning."); see also id. at 75 ("Concede what Mr. Madison's
theology assumes: there is a God living and distinct from every human creature; this
God is the Creator and the Lawgiver and the Governor of the world; he is a "he"; he
takes an interest in, and satisfaction from, the homage humans render him and he
will condignly punish humans who neglect to observe the commands that he communicates through conscience. Then on what basis can a mere human or mere association of humans intrude their regulations to prevent an individual from obeying
God?").
237 A standard criticism of Madison's understanding of religion is that it is too
individualistic-God and the individual conscience together in splendid isolation.
The parallel criticism I have advanced is that Madison's 'Justification" of religious
liberty is overly individualistic. The demands of the process of coming to truth, including the exigence of dialogue, would be the starting point for a theory and justification of religious liberty that are both personal and communitarian. For analyses of
religious liberty that take the dialogic nature of human knowing as the starting point,
see HOOPER, supra note 143, at 218; Angela C. Carmella, Mary Ann Glendon on Religious Liberty: The Social Nature of the Person and the Public Nature of Religion, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. RE-v. 1191 (1998); Leon Hooper, A Closing Reflection on OurAcademic Praxis,
in JOHN COURTNEY MuRRAY & THE GROWTH OF TRADITION 41-59 (J. Leon Hooper,
S.J., & Todd Davit Whitmore eds., 1996); Frederick G. Lawrence, John Courtney Murray
and the Ambiguities of Liberalism, inJoHN COURTNEY MuRRAY & THE GROWTH OF TRADITION, supra. Noonan only sometimes understands Vatican II as having rooted its theory of religious liberty, including the right to religious association, in a theory of the
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possibility that on his analysis, legislators are permitted to shape public life on religious grounds purely privately accessible. To be suspicious of such an analysis, one need not have enthroned Rawlsian
"public reason." One need only be living up to the demands of the
23 8
dynamic human desire to understand.

exigences of human cognition. Compare NOONAN, supra note 1, at 350-51 with id. at
352.
238 In his analysis of the origins of Free Exercise, following upon his quotation of
the Memorial and Remonstrance, Michael McConnell observes unexceptionably:
Far from being based on the "respect for the person as an independent
source of value," the free exercise of religion is set apart from mere exercise
of human judgment by the fact that the "source of value" is prior and superior to both the individual and the civil society. The freedom of religion is
unalienable because it is a duty to God and not a privilege of the individual.
The free exercise clause accords a special, protected status to religious conscience not because religious judgments are better, truer, or more likely to
be moral than nonreligious judgments, but because the obligations entailed
by religion transcend the individual and are outside the individual's control.
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HAuv. L. REV. 1409, 1497 (1990) (citation omitted). But, prescinding from
McConnell's historical point about the reasons behind the First Amendment's religion language, I would add that the conditions that a human obligation be "transcend[ent]" and "outside the individual's control," and therefore worthy of
government's accomodation, are satisfied where, as on Lonergan's analysis, the person is under an unalienable duty to seek to know the real and to act accordingly. For
Lonergan, the exercise of "human judgment" (understood in Lonergan's technical
sense) is not "mere" but, instead, the way humans reach out toward the real that
includes the divine. Cf. Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment,
1982 U. IL. L. REv. 579, 603 ("there is at bedrock only a gossamer line between
'rational' and 'supernatural' causation-the former really being little more capable of
'scientific proof than the latter").

